On 28 Mar 2014, at 23:41, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his
consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit
or implicit position on personal identity in functionalism.
This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of functionalism, which
is too much general I think, but I was still thinking it could have
a relation with "functionalism" in the math sense, where an object
is defined by its functional relations with other objects, and the
identity *is* in the functionality.
Then "function" is always used in two very different sense,
especially in computer science, as it can be extensional function
(defined by the functionality), or its intension (the code, the
description, the "body").
Could your functionalist say yes to a doctor, which build the right
computer (to replicate his consciousness), and add enough "original
atoms" to preserve the identity? Is someone saying yes to that
doctor, but only if a priest blesses the artificial brain with holy
water a functionalist?
Can you describe an experience refuting functionalism (in your sense)?
Just to help me to understand. Thanks.
A person could conceivably say the following: it is impossible for a
computer to be conscious because consciousness is a magical
substance that comes from God. Therefore, if you make an artificial
brain it may behave like a real brain, but it will be a zombie. God
could by a miracle grant the artificial brain consciousness, and he
could even grant it a similar consciousness to my own, so that it
will think it is me.
Hmm... OK, but usually comp is not just that a computer can be
conscious, but that it can be conscious (c= can support consciousness)
in virtue of doing computation. That is why I add sometime "qua
computatio" to remind this. If functionalism accept a role for a
magical substance, it is obviously non computationalism.
However, it won't *really* be me, because it could only be me if we
were numerically identical, and not even God can make two distinct
things numerically identical.
Even with God. This makes the argument weird. Even if God cannot do
that. But it can make sense, with "magic" matter, many things can make
sense.
I don't accept this position, but it is the position many people
have on personal identity, and it is independent of their position
on the possibility of computer consciousness.
OK.
I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a
computer simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way
with Bruno's conclusion that there is no actual physical computer
and all possible computations are necessarily implemented by virtue
of their status as platonic objects.
It is not so much in virtue of their status as platonic object
(which seems to imply some metaphysical hypothesis), but in virtue
of being true independently of my will, or even of the notion of
universe, god, etc.
But there is the further notion of implementation. The obvious
objection is that computations might be "true" but they cannot give
rise to consciousness unless implemented on a physical computer.
Only IF you assume that one universal machine (the physical universe
or some part of it) has a special (metaphysical) status, and that it
plays a special role. Implementation in computer science is defined
purely by a relation between a universal machine/number and a machine/
number (which can be universal or not).
u implements machine x if phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y) for all y, and that
can be defined in the theory quoted below.
A physicalist, somehow, just pick out one universal "being" and
asserts that it is more fundamental. The computationalist know better,
and know that the special physical universal machine has to win some
competition below our substitution level.
Step 8 of the UDA says the physical computer is not necessary; which
is a metaphysical position if anything is.
It is metaphysical, OK, but that is part of the subject matter. But it
is not a "position" or "opinion", only a logical consequence, with
some use of Occam, to be sure, as it is a consequence in *applied*
logic. The whole meta-point is that we can do metaphysics and theology
in the hypothetico-deductive way, free of a priori metaphysical
assumption, except the "yes doctor", which is as much metaphysical
than practical.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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