> On 28 Mar 2014, at 1:47 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
>> On 27 Mar 2014, at 11:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 27 March 2014 18:48, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness
>>>>>>>> flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence
>>>>>>>> we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical
>>>>>>>> communication between its distant parts.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's
>>>>>>> "Physics of Immortality" view which basically says that identical
>>>>>>> quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we
>>>>>>> experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until
>>>>>>> differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is
>>>>>> secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a
>>>>>> simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the
>>>>>> universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar
>>>>>> consciousness.
>>>>>
>>>>> Assuming comp!
>>>>> If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver,
>>>>> the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable
>>>>> that although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This
>>>>> makes no sense, if you use some form of comp.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of
>>>>>> theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about
>>>>>> because you can't be sure which copy you are.
>>>>>
>>>>> Assuming comp. If the exact "infinite state" of the bile is required,
>>>>> then by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this
>>>>> seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive
>>>>> that the other might be an impostor an authentically "other person".
>>>>
>>>> If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a similar
>>>> brain you will make a similar consciousness.
>>>
>>> yes, but if the brain secrets consciousness, and if my identity is in the
>>> identity of the matter involved, the consciousness is conceivably similar,
>>> but not "mine". I agree this makes not a lot of sense, but this is because
>>> we put the identity (and consciousness) in the relational information, and
>>> this uses comp.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here.
>>>> The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and
>>>> as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's
>>>> sleep.
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone who
>>> associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is the same
>>> person after one night, but not after "seven years" (assuming the whole
>>> material body constitution has been changed). That is a difficulty for his
>>> theory, but it is logically conceivable if we abandon
>>> comp/functionalism/CTM. Comp has not that problem, but then eventually we
>>> must explain matter from information handled through number
>>> relations/computations.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>
>> It doesn't follow that if consciousness is substrate specific it can't be
>> duplicated;
>
> OK. But the point is that it might, and that would be the case if "my
> consciousness" is attached to both the exact quantum state of my brain and
> substrate specific (which is a vague thing, yet incompatible with
> computationalism).
>
>
>
>> it can in fact be duplicated in a straightforward way, by making a
>> biological brain.
>
> But we do have evidences that biological copying is at some rather high
> level, and that it does not copy any piece of matter. It replaces all
> molecules and atoms with "new" atoms extracted from food.
>
> Here I am just playing the role of devil's advocate and I assume non comp to
> make a logical point.
>
>
>
>
>> Even if consciousness is due to an immaterial soul one could say that it
>> could be duplicated if God performs a miracle.
>
> Right again, but here too, it might not be the case. God could decide to NOT
> do a miracle, given that It is so powerful.
>
>
>
>> The claim that the duplicated consciousness "isn't really me" is a claim
>> about the nature of personal identity, and is independent of any theory of
>> how consciousness is generated.
>
> Not if the theory of consciousness is based on personal identity. Your claim
> makes sense again for a functionalist, but not necessarily to all
> non-functionalists.
A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his consciousness but
it would not really be him. There is no explicit or implicit position on
personal identity in functionalism.
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