On 27 Mar 2014, at 11:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 March 2014 18:48, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our
consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that
as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if
there is no physical communication between its distant parts.
Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank
Tipler's "Physics of Immortality" view which basically says that
identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one
another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite
BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!)
You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness
is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so
that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains
in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a
similar consciousness.
Assuming comp!
If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my
liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is
conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be
another person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp.
This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about
type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively
flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are.
Assuming comp. If the exact "infinite state" of the bile is
required, then by definition, the other person is a different
person. I agree this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice.
After all, I *can* conceive that the other might be an impostor an
authentically "other person".
If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a
similar brain you will make a similar consciousness.
yes, but if the brain secrets consciousness, and if my identity is
in the identity of the matter involved, the consciousness is
conceivably similar, but not "mine". I agree this makes not a lot of
sense, but this is because we put the identity (and consciousness)
in the relational information, and this uses comp.
The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here.
The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent
to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after
a night's sleep.
I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone
who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he
is the same person after one night, but not after "seven
years" (assuming the whole material body constitution has been
changed). That is a difficulty for his theory, but it is logically
conceivable if we abandon comp/functionalism/CTM. Comp has not that
problem, but then eventually we must explain matter from information
handled through number relations/computations.
Bruno
It doesn't follow that if consciousness is substrate specific it
can't be duplicated;
OK. But the point is that it might, and that would be the case if "my
consciousness" is attached to both the exact quantum state of my brain
and substrate specific (which is a vague thing, yet incompatible with
computationalism).
it can in fact be duplicated in a straightforward way, by making a
biological brain.
But we do have evidences that biological copying is at some rather
high level, and that it does not copy any piece of matter. It replaces
all molecules and atoms with "new" atoms extracted from food.
Here I am just playing the role of devil's advocate and I assume non
comp to make a logical point.
Even if consciousness is due to an immaterial soul one could say
that it could be duplicated if God performs a miracle.
Right again, but here too, it might not be the case. God could decide
to NOT do a miracle, given that It is so powerful.
The claim that the duplicated consciousness "isn't really me" is a
claim about the nature of personal identity, and is independent of
any theory of how consciousness is generated.
Not if the theory of consciousness is based on personal identity. Your
claim makes sense again for a functionalist, but not necessarily to
all non-functionalists.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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