On 27 March 2014 18:48, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness >>>> flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are >>>> immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication >>>> between its distant parts. >>>> >>>> Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's >>> "Physics of Immortality" view which basically says that identical quantum >>> states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all >>> the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation >>> occurs. (Cosmic, man!) >>> >> >> You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is >> secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a >> simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe >> similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. >> >> >> Assuming comp! >> If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver, >> the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable that >> although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This makes no >> sense, if you use some form of comp. >> >> >> >> This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of >> theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because >> you can't be sure which copy you are. >> >> >> Assuming comp. If the exact "infinite state" of the bile is required, >> then by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this >> seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive >> that the other might be an impostor an authentically "other person". >> > > If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a similar > brain you will make a similar consciousness. > > > yes, but if the brain secrets consciousness, and if my identity is in the > identity of the matter involved, the consciousness is conceivably similar, > but not "mine". I agree this makes not a lot of sense, but this is because > we put the identity (and consciousness) in the relational information, and > this uses comp. > > > > > The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. > > The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and > as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's > sleep. > > > > I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone who > associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is the same > person after one night, but not after "seven years" (assuming the whole > material body constitution has been changed). That is a difficulty for his > theory, but it is logically conceivable if we abandon > comp/functionalism/CTM. Comp has not that problem, but then eventually we > must explain matter from information handled through number > relations/computations. > > Bruno >
It doesn't follow that if consciousness is substrate specific it can't be duplicated; it can in fact be duplicated in a straightforward way, by making a biological brain. Even if consciousness is due to an immaterial soul one could say that it could be duplicated if God performs a miracle. The claim that the duplicated consciousness "isn't really me" is a claim about the nature of personal identity, and is independent of any theory of how consciousness is generated. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
