On 29 March 2014 19:27, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> > wrote:
> > On 28 Mar 2014, at 23:41, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal > <[email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> > > wrote: > >> >> On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his >> consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or >> implicit position on personal identity in functionalism. >> >> >> This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of functionalism, which is >> too much general I think, but I was still thinking it could have a relation >> with "functionalism" in the math sense, where an object is defined by its >> functional relations with other objects, and the identity *is* in the >> functionality. >> >> Then "function" is always used in two very different sense, especially in >> computer science, as it can be extensional function (defined by the >> functionality), or its intension (the code, the description, the "body"). >> >> Could your functionalist say yes to a doctor, which build the right >> computer (to replicate his consciousness), and add enough "original atoms" >> to preserve the identity? Is someone saying yes to that doctor, but only if >> a priest blesses the artificial brain with holy water a functionalist? >> >> Can you describe an experience refuting functionalism (in your sense)? >> Just to help me to understand. Thanks. >> > > A person could conceivably say the following: it is impossible for a > computer to be conscious because consciousness is a magical substance that > comes from God. Therefore, if you make an artificial brain it may behave > like a real brain, but it will be a zombie. God could by a miracle grant > the artificial brain consciousness, and he could even grant it a similar > consciousness to my own, so that it will think it is me. > > > Hmm... OK, but usually comp is not just that a computer can be conscious, > but that it can be conscious (c= can support consciousness) in virtue of > doing computation. That is why I add sometime "qua computatio" to remind > this. If functionalism accept a role for a magical substance, it is > obviously non computationalism. > Of course, the computer or computing device must be doing the computations; if not it is unconscious or only potentially consciousness. > However, it won't *really* be me, because it could only be me if we were > numerically identical, and not even God can make two distinct things > numerically identical. > > > Even with God. This makes the argument weird. Even if God cannot do that. > But it can make sense, with "magic" matter, many things can make sense. > It's not so weird, since even God or magic can't do something logically impossible like make 1 = 2, and under one theory of personal identity (which by the way I think is completely wrong) that is what would have to happen for a person to survive teleportation. > > I don't accept this position, but it is the position many people have on > personal identity, and it is independent of their position on the > possibility of computer consciousness. > > > OK. > > I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer >> simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's >> conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible >> computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as >> platonic objects. >> >> >> >> It is not so much in virtue of their status as platonic object (which >> seems to imply some metaphysical hypothesis), but in virtue of being true >> independently of my will, or even of the notion of universe, god, etc. >> > > But there is the further notion of implementation. The obvious objection > is that computations might be "true" but they cannot give rise to > consciousness unless implemented on a physical computer. > > > Only IF you assume that one universal machine (the physical universe or > some part of it) has a special (metaphysical) status, and that it plays a > special role. Implementation in computer science is defined purely by a > relation between a universal machine/number and a machine/number (which can > be universal or not). > u implements machine x if phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y) for all y, and that can be > defined in the theory quoted below. > > A physicalist, somehow, just pick out one universal "being" and asserts > that it is more fundamental. The computationalist know better, and know > that the special physical universal machine has to win some competition > below our substitution level. > But most computationalists are probably physicalists who believe that consciousness can only occur if an actual physical computer is using energy and heating up in the process of implementing computations. They don't believe that the abstract computation on its own is enough. They may be wrong, but that's what they think, and they call themselves computationalists. > Step 8 of the UDA says the physical computer is not necessary; which is a > metaphysical position if anything is. > > > > It is metaphysical, OK, but that is part of the subject matter. But it is > not a "position" or "opinion", only a logical consequence, with some use of > Occam, to be sure, as it is a consequence in *applied* logic. The whole > meta-point is that we can do metaphysics and theology in the > hypothetico-deductive way, free of a priori metaphysical assumption, except > the "yes doctor", which is as much metaphysical than practical. > I think the "yes doctor" applies assuming computationalism AND assuming that personal identity is transferable, which are two separate things. However, if computationalism is true and physicalism is false then it does also follow that personal identity is transferable, since one can't point to a particular implementation and say this one is me but that one isn't. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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