On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our
consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that
as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if
there is no physical communication between its distant parts.
Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank
Tipler's "Physics of Immortality" view which basically says that
identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one
another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite
BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!)
You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness
is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so
that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in
the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar
consciousness.
Assuming comp!
If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my
liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is
conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be
another person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp.
This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about
type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit
about because you can't be sure which copy you are.
Assuming comp. If the exact "infinite state" of the bile is
required, then by definition, the other person is a different
person. I agree this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice.
After all, I *can* conceive that the other might be an impostor an
authentically "other person".
If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a
similar brain you will make a similar consciousness.
yes, but if the brain secrets consciousness, and if my identity is in
the identity of the matter involved, the consciousness is conceivably
similar, but not "mine". I agree this makes not a lot of sense, but
this is because we put the identity (and consciousness) in the
relational information, and this uses comp.
The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here.
The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent
to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after
a night's sleep.
I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone
who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is
the same person after one night, but not after "seven years" (assuming
the whole material body constitution has been changed). That is a
difficulty for his theory, but it is logically conceivable if we
abandon comp/functionalism/CTM. Comp has not that problem, but then
eventually we must explain matter from information handled through
number relations/computations.
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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