On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, [email protected] wrote:
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:
On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of
emulating one part relative to another part that is not
emulated, i.e. is "real".
If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare
with nature.
When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and
some don't.
Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the
question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed
the question about what it means for something to exist.
So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not
falsified because it may be true somewhere else?
I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter
what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather
funny, pun?)
But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it
isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at
some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw
in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't.
But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that
we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is
that this requires predictions about what happens here and now,
where some things happen and some don't. "Predictions" that
something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea
of testable.
But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white
noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on
this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the
local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the
arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic
provided some quantum erazing, or destructive interference in the
observations.
To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the
quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for
comp, as it needs to if comp is true.
My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano
Arithmetic, that concerns you.
It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem
in arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics.
I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum
propositional tautologies.
Bruno
So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your
story of testability.
So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno,
explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and
attest to that?
"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics
match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we
will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but
if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well,
comp + the classical theory of knowledge)."
How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of
knowledge" change the commitment to falsification?
Good question. I let other answer, but frankly, it is just a matter of
*studying* the papers. Note that in some presentation, I take the
classical theory (or definition) of knowledge granted, but in other
presentation, I explain and answer your question with some detail, and
it is the object of the thesis.
More on this, and you can ask the question to me. The point is in
focus, not the success of my pedagogy on this list.
Bruno
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