On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:
On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of
emulating one part relative to another part that is not
emulated, i.e. is "real".
If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare
with nature.
When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and
some don't.
Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the
question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the
question about what it means for something to exist.
So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not
falsified because it may be true somewhere else?
I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter
what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather
funny, pun?)
But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't,
which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some
level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what
Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't.
But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that
we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is
that this requires predictions about what happens here and now,
where some things happen and some don't. "Predictions" that
something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea
of testable.
But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white
noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on
this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local
erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the
arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic
provided some quantum erazing, or destructive interference in the
observations.
To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the
quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for
comp, as it needs to if comp is true.
My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano
Arithmetic, that concerns you.
It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in
arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics.
I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum
propositional tautologies.
Bruno
Brent
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