On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: > > On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net <javascript:>> wrote: > >> On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net <javascript:>>wrote: >> >>> On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating one >>> part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real". >>> >>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with >>> nature. >>> >>> When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some >>> don't. >>> >> >> Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question >> about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about >> what it means for something to exist. >> >> So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified >> because it may be true somewhere else? >> > > I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter what > comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) > > But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, > which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or > it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives > from that assumption, or there isn't. > > > But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we > should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this > requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things > happen and some don't. "Predictions" that something happens somewhere in > the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. > > > > But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise > and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and > the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the > cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 > proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, > or destructive interference in the observations. > > To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the quantum > theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, as it > needs to if comp is true. > > My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano > Arithmetic, that concerns you. > > It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in > arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. > > I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum > propositional tautologies. > > Bruno > So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story of testability. So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno, explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to that?
*"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well, comp + the classical theory of knowledge)." * How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of knowledge" change the commitment to falsification? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
