On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: > > On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > >> On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <[email protected] <javascript:>>wrote: >> >>> On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating one >>> part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real". >>> >>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with >>> nature. >>> >>> When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some >>> don't. >>> >> >> Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question >> about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about >> what it means for something to exist. >> >> So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified >> because it may be true somewhere else? >> > > I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter what > comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) > > But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, > which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or > it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives > from that assumption, or there isn't. > > > But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we > should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this > requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things > happen and some don't. "Predictions" that something happens somewhere in > the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. > > > > But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise > and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and > the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the > cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 > proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, > or destructive interference in the observations. > > To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the quantum > theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, as it > needs to if comp is true. > > My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano > Arithmetic, that concerns you. > > It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in > arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. > > I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum > propositional tautologies. > > Bruno > So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story of testability. So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno, explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to that?
*"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well, comp + the classical theory of knowledge)." * How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of knowledge" change the commitment to falsification? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
