On 6/10/2014 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Jun 2014, at 19:07, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/9/2014 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
On 9 June 2014 18:24, meekerdb <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    On 6/8/2014 4:03 PM, LizR wrote:
    David Nyman gave a much more rigorous definition of primitive materialism in
    another thread (he calls it "primordial").

        ISTM that what is supposed to be "primordial" about a specific set of
        entities and their relations is precisely that they *exclusively* 
underlie
        (or more correctly, comprise) everything that is "really real". So the
        hierarchical structure of everything we observe thereafter - be it 
physical,
        chemical, biological, physiological, etc. - would be deemed to be
        underpinned, exclusively and exhaustively, by such a primordial 
substratum.

    That's a definition of ur-stuff, but it doesn't say anything about 
"material".  I
    agree with Bruno that saying the most basic ontology is "matter" is 
meaningless
    because "matter" isn't well defined.  Physicists have regarded it as 
substances,
    particle, fields, quantum fields, strings,...  If it's computation or 
arithmetic
    those are just the basic ontologies of different theories.  What's really of
    interest is whether the theory can describe and predict what happens at 
level of
    kicking things and have them kick back.


OK, so please provide a definition of primitive materialism.

Hmmm? I write that "matter" isn't well defined and so you ask that I define "primitive materialism"?

I guess I could venture that it's the ontology of any TOE in which interactions 
are all 3p.


Then with comp, elementary arithmetic is a primitive materialism. That sense seems to me much too large. Usually primitive matter refer to some "existing" physical reality or realities.

The very fact that you put scare quotes around "existing" tells me the concept in not well defined. I think of physics as the science of what we share in experience - i.e. 3p, excluding things that are 1p only. The theory is that we can share them because we share a physical world.


Comp offers a spiritual TOE, I would say, where its matter is testable, in the sense that it needs to gives a knower and an observer in arithmetic, and incompleteness just guaranties that this happens, for a wide range of reasonable numbers, by showing that the logic of the philosophical variants of "rational beliefs" does provide the respect of those conditions, with respect to the physical reality by providing the propositional logic of the observable.

?? Couldn't parse that.

Brent



Any one can make the comparison, or improves the algorithm I give to search a distinction (above the fact that the comp QL proves *more* theorems, note).

Bruno

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