On 09 Jun 2014, at 23:46, LizR wrote:
On 10 June 2014 05:07, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 6/9/2014 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
On 9 June 2014 18:24, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 6/8/2014 4:03 PM, LizR wrote:
David Nyman gave a much more rigorous definition of primitive
materialism in another thread (he calls it "primordial").
ISTM that what is supposed to be "primordial" about a specific set
of entities and their relations is precisely that they
*exclusively* underlie (or more correctly, comprise) everything
that is "really real". So the hierarchical structure of everything
we observe thereafter - be it physical, chemical, biological,
physiological, etc. - would be deemed to be underpinned,
exclusively and exhaustively, by such a primordial substratum.
That's a definition of ur-stuff, but it doesn't say anything about
"material". I agree with Bruno that saying the most basic ontology
is "matter" is meaningless because "matter" isn't well defined.
Physicists have regarded it as substances, particle, fields,
quantum fields, strings,... If it's computation or
arithmetic those are just the basic ontologies of different
theories. What's really of interest is whether the theory can
describe and predict what happens at level of kicking things and
have them kick back.
OK, so please provide a definition of primitive materialism.
Hmmm? I write that "matter" isn't well defined and so you ask that
I define "primitive materialism"?
Well exactly. You were going off topic, so I felt free to try to
steer you back onto it. To repeat the question - a lot of people
believe that something called "primitive materialism" (at least on
this forum) is an accurate description of the universe at the
fundamental level (assuming there is one), possibly without
realising that they do so. I was trying to find out what definition
they are using (consciously or otherwise) mainly for Mr Ross's
benefit, although I'm always interested too of course.
I guess I could venture that it's the ontology of any TOE in which
interactions are all 3p.
OK, thanks. So I would guess that it's equivalent to eliminativism,
as I think it's called - the idea that consciousness is an illusion
("albeit a persistent one"). It does seem that way to me.
Are you saying that consciousness is an illusion?
Independently of comp and materialism, I cannot make sense to the
statement "consciousness is an illusion", given that any illusion
requires consciousness to be.
Then I argue that if we take computationalism seriously enough,
primitive matter does not exist, and matter as stuff is an illusion,
but not matter as the border of the accessible consistent realities,
that also the border of the universal mind, that is the true sigma_1
sentences. But the accessibility relation depends on the points of you
that you adopt.
Bruno
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