On 10 Jun 2014, at 23:03, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/10/2014 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jun 2014, at 19:07, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/9/2014 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
On 9 June 2014 18:24, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 6/8/2014 4:03 PM, LizR wrote:
David Nyman gave a much more rigorous definition of primitive
materialism in another thread (he calls it "primordial").
ISTM that what is supposed to be "primordial" about a specific
set of entities and their relations is precisely that they
*exclusively* underlie (or more correctly, comprise) everything
that is "really real". So the hierarchical structure of
everything we observe thereafter - be it physical, chemical,
biological, physiological, etc. - would be deemed to be
underpinned, exclusively and exhaustively, by such a primordial
substratum.
That's a definition of ur-stuff, but it doesn't say anything
about "material". I agree with Bruno that saying the most basic
ontology is "matter" is meaningless because "matter" isn't well
defined. Physicists have regarded it as substances, particle,
fields, quantum fields, strings,... If it's computation or
arithmetic those are just the basic ontologies of different
theories. What's really of interest is whether the theory can
describe and predict what happens at level of kicking things and
have them kick back.
OK, so please provide a definition of primitive materialism.
Hmmm? I write that "matter" isn't well defined and so you ask
that I define "primitive materialism"?
I guess I could venture that it's the ontology of any TOE in which
interactions are all 3p.
Then with comp, elementary arithmetic is a primitive materialism.
That sense seems to me much too large. Usually primitive matter
refer to some "existing" physical reality or realities.
The very fact that you put scare quotes around "existing" tells me
the concept in not well defined. I think of physics as the science
of what we share in experience - i.e. 3p, excluding things that are
1p only. The theory is that we can share them because we share a
physical world.
OK, but this is refuted by comp. We can share them because it is a law
in arithmetic that Löbian number can share (be emulated) by the same
universal numbers, with the right and sharable measure.
Comp offers a spiritual TOE, I would say, where its matter is
testable, in the sense that it needs to gives a knower and an
observer in arithmetic, and incompleteness just guaranties that
this happens, for a wide range of reasonable numbers, by showing
that the logic of the philosophical variants of "rational beliefs"
does provide the respect of those conditions, with respect to the
physical reality by providing the propositional logic of the
observable.
?? Couldn't parse that.
OK. Sorry. I rewrite it.
Comp defines belief recursively, by something like Believe (for all x,
0 ≠ s(x)), believe (x + 0 = x) etc.
The theory will apply to all machine sharing those beliefs.
By incompleteness, the logic of belief will be different from the
logic of knowledge (true belief), and observation (consistent beliefs)
and sensation (true consistent belief).
Now, if such knowledge and observation (mathematically defined) did
not obey respectively to intuitionistic logic and to quantum logic,
classical comp would already be refuted.
But that is not happening. Bp & p does obey S4, and observable (Bp &
Dp) does obeys a quantum logic, as far as we have seen until now.
Bruno
Brent
Any one can make the comparison, or improves the algorithm I give
to search a distinction (above the fact that the comp QL proves
*more* theorems, note).
Bruno
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