On 09 Jun 2014, at 19:07, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/9/2014 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
On 9 June 2014 18:24, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 6/8/2014 4:03 PM, LizR wrote:
David Nyman gave a much more rigorous definition of primitive
materialism in another thread (he calls it "primordial").
ISTM that what is supposed to be "primordial" about a specific set
of entities and their relations is precisely that they
*exclusively* underlie (or more correctly, comprise) everything
that is "really real". So the hierarchical structure of everything
we observe thereafter - be it physical, chemical, biological,
physiological, etc. - would be deemed to be underpinned,
exclusively and exhaustively, by such a primordial substratum.
That's a definition of ur-stuff, but it doesn't say anything about
"material". I agree with Bruno that saying the most basic ontology
is "matter" is meaningless because "matter" isn't well defined.
Physicists have regarded it as substances, particle, fields,
quantum fields, strings,... If it's computation or arithmetic
those are just the basic ontologies of different theories. What's
really of interest is whether the theory can describe and predict
what happens at level of kicking things and have them kick back.
OK, so please provide a definition of primitive materialism.
Hmmm? I write that "matter" isn't well defined and so you ask that
I define "primitive materialism"?
I guess I could venture that it's the ontology of any TOE in which
interactions are all 3p.
Then with comp, elementary arithmetic is a primitive materialism. That
sense seems to me much too large. Usually primitive matter refer to
some "existing" physical reality or realities.
Comp offers a spiritual TOE, I would say, where its matter is
testable, in the sense that it needs to gives a knower and an observer
in arithmetic, and incompleteness just guaranties that this happens,
for a wide range of reasonable numbers, by showing that the logic of
the philosophical variants of "rational beliefs" does provide the
respect of those conditions, with respect to the physical reality by
providing the propositional logic of the observable.
Any one can make the comparison, or improves the algorithm I give to
search a distinction (above the fact that the comp QL proves *more*
theorems, note).
Bruno
Brent
Why doesn't the proton like the electron?
"He's always so negative!"
-- my son (15)
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