On 13 Jun 2014, at 01:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/12/2014 9:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Further more, I'm not even sure that the reductionist program of
looking for what's most fundamental (in a TOE) and reifying it
is the right way to look at things. It leads to making strings
or numbers, which we never experience, "real" and everything we
experience (on which we base or theories) "illusory". I think
this called the error of the misplaced concrete.
In that case we are just no machine and should never accept an
artificial brain (or UDA is invalid of course).
That doesn't follow. The doctor can still make a prosthetic brain.
Then you have to assume matter, and some magical non Turing
emulable "essential" property, like its "real existence" to get
consciousness (and prevent it in the arithmetical reality). that is
akin to non-comp.
That's confusing (computation theory of mind)->(doctor can make
artificial brain) with (doctor can make artificial brain)-
>(computational theory of mind).
Well, I was assuming you intended the guy to survive with the
prosthetic brain.
We have by definition:
comp theory of mind <-> doctor can make (in principle) a successful
artificial brain.
Bruno
Brent
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