On Saturday, June 14, 2014 7:37:25 PM UTC+1, Brent wrote: > > On 6/14/2014 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > If there were a reason why a primitive matter was needed (to select and > incarnate > > consciousness), there would be number X and Nu which would emulate > validly "Brunos and > > Davids" finding that reason, and proving *correctly* that they don't > belong only to > > arithmetic, > > ?? Why might that not be a truth of arithmetic that is not provable? > > Brent > > > Allowing the logic that a robust theory is its final product including only the consequences actually worked through, and only as far as they are worked through. The rest being philosophical or non-distinct.
Also allowing that a robust theory in science speaks to an 'objective reality' in which for the same knowledge and accuracy, the same final product will materialize by *any* of whatever alternate theoretical routes exist. THEN the logic is that while there are playoffs between going for simple initial postulates and computing from there, or devising more abstracted postulated relevant to the whole domain defining the final product, there cannot be a knowledge lighter or heavier route between such alternate paths. If you go with simple initial postulates, then all you do is transfer the problem to the computation of consequence section. It is NOT logical to speak of simple postulates with non-distinct consequences for some apparently reasonable much larger domain, as equal to a theory that is robust across that domain. Like Relativity. It's immensely robust across a very large domain. Would it have been equal had Einstein or whoever, produced a theory that *suggested* a nature across the same domain, but offered no worked through methods and equations for that domain? This sort of thing was fairly understood by the geniuses of yesteryear like Richard Feynman. What happened while I was getting stoned all those years? Did someone overturn these understandings? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
