Sorry for bumping an old post. I comment both Brent and Liz. It is an
interesting subject, and those post here are crucial (for the
undersatnding of the comp mind-body problem).
On 10 Jun 2014, at 10:07, LizR wrote:
On 10 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
Yeah that's pretty close, although I'd say consciousness just occurs
at a different level of description and is equally "real" at that
level. The second law of thermodynamics is "real" at the level of
thermodynamics, even though it can be seen as implied by statistical
mechanics. It is more general than any specific statistical
mechanics. I don't think p-zombies are possible, so consciousness
is a necessary aspect of some kinds of physical processes.
Very plausibly. But also a necessary aspect of some computations or
set of computations (with comp). The problem will be to relate all
this in a mathematically valid way, taking computer science and the
FPI into account.
So I guess that you think that consciousness is as real as the
second law, which is (as far as I know) an emergent property of the
universe having been arranged in a special way in the past (plus the
laws of physics, although I imagine most varieties of physics would
give a version of the 2nd law, given a special arrangement of the
constituents of a universe).
So it isn't really, really, really real <363.gif> .... but it is a
good high level approximation for -- er -- something. <35F.gif>
But here, if consciousness was explainable in the way of the second
law, that would still not solve the hard part, nor the comp measure
problem part.
It is easier to accept some semi-axiomatic of consciousness (like true
but non justifiable and still knowable + invariant for the universal
number change below the subst level), and reason, and show the
problems we (the numbers) are confronted with.
Comp seems obvious for many scientists, but 'theologically' it is a
very strong local 3p self-finiteness assumption.
Bruno
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