On 13 Jun 2014, at 21:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/13/2014 9:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Jun 2014, at 01:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/12/2014 9:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Further more, I'm not even sure that the reductionist program
of looking for what's most fundamental (in a TOE) and reifying
it is the right way to look at things. It leads to making
strings or numbers, which we never experience, "real" and
everything we experience (on which we base or theories)
"illusory". I think this called the error of the misplaced
concrete.
In that case we are just no machine and should never accept an
artificial brain (or UDA is invalid of course).
That doesn't follow. The doctor can still make a prosthetic
brain.
Then you have to assume matter, and some magical non Turing
emulable "essential" property, like its "real existence" to get
consciousness (and prevent it in the arithmetical reality). that
is akin to non-comp.
That's confusing (computation theory of mind)->(doctor can make
artificial brain) with (doctor can make artificial brain)-
>(computational theory of mind).
Well, I was assuming you intended the guy to survive with the
prosthetic brain.
We have by definition:
comp theory of mind <-> doctor can make (in principle) a successful
artificial brain.
But I think you equivocate on "comp theory of mind". Your eight
step argument is trying to get from (doctor can make an artificial
brain) to (comp theory of mind); so it's circular to assume it by
definition unless you mean two different things by "comp theory of
mind" depending on which way the -> or <- goes.
?
Comp theory of mind is defined (with <->, not -> nor <-) by "yes
doctor". It assumes nothing about existence or not of primitive
matter. It assumes some physical reality rich enough to emulate
universal machine like brain and doctors.
Then the reasoning show that any possible physical reality has to be
recovered uniquely from arithmetic.
You introduce a difference between "comp theory of mind" (which is the
comp hypothesis) and "yes doctor", which is just a tool to explain
what we mean by "comp theory of mind".
Bruno
Brent
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