On 6/13/2014 9:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Jun 2014, at 01:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/12/2014 9:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Further more, I'm not even sure that the reductionist program of looking for what's
most fundamental (in a TOE) and reifying it is the right way to look at things. It
leads to making strings or numbers, which we never experience, "real" and
everything we experience (on which we base or theories) "illusory". I think this
called the error of the misplaced concrete.
In that case we are just no machine and should never accept an artificial brain (or
UDA is invalid of course).
That doesn't follow. The doctor can still make a prosthetic brain.
Then you have to assume matter, and some magical non Turing emulable "essential"
property, like its "real existence" to get consciousness (and prevent it in the
arithmetical reality). that is akin to non-comp.
That's confusing (computation theory of mind)->(doctor can make artificial brain) with
(doctor can make artificial brain)->(computational theory of mind).
Well, I was assuming you intended the guy to survive with the prosthetic brain.
We have by definition:
comp theory of mind <-> doctor can make (in principle) a successful artificial
brain.
But I think you equivocate on "comp theory of mind". Your eight step argument is trying
to get from (doctor can make an artificial brain) to (comp theory of mind); so it's
circular to assume it by definition unless you mean two different things by "comp theory
of mind" depending on which way the -> or <- goes.
Brent
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