On 1 July 2014 03:14, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 30 Jun 2014, at 02:14, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > On 26 June 2014 12:03, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> On 25 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for consciousness, or >>>>> for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the argument above, makes >>>>> that role very mysterious, so much that it is not clear why we could >>>>> still say yes to the doctor in virtue of correct digital rendering. >>>> >>>> >>>> You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use matter to >>>> make your brain prosthesis. >>> >>> >>> Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be you, so >>> if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital copy, you really >>> do die. While in comp the digital copy is you, by definition. >>> >>> ?? Comp is the theory that it will be you after the doctor gives you a >>> prothesis for your brain (plus some other assumptions). It will be you >>> even after you are duplicated (though it's troubling for JKC that "you" is >>> both singular and plural). >>> >> Yes, that's right. And primitive materialism would distinguish between two >> identical versions of you, if only because they occupy different positions >> (and due to no-cloning). So a PM copy could only ever be a "copy that thinks >> it's you", while a comp copy would be one that actually is you (assuming >> comp is correct, of course). > > > I don't think "comp" necessarily includes the idea that the copy would be > you, just that the copy would be conscious in the same way as you. > > > Then you are using "comp" in a different sense than in the UDA. I mean that > if the copy is conscious in the same way as you, but still is not you (which > is often argued with the teleportation without annihilation), then you would > not say that you survive in the usual clinical sense of surviving from the > first person perspective. The other guy would only be a well done impostor > and you would say "No thanks" to the doctor. >
OK, I misunderstood this part of your definition. You have suggested that comp requires faith, but I thought that this faith involves believing that the computerised brain will have the same sort of consciousness as the original; not faith that the copy will be the same person as the original. The latter claim, I think, follows from the former logically and not as a matter of faith, because its negation would result in absurdity as I could then state that I do not survive from one moment to the next but only have the delusional belief that I do. > > Obviously it is *necessary* that the copy be conscious if it is also you, but > whether it is *sufficient* is a further argument in the philosophy of > personal identity. I think it is sufficient, but not everyone agrees. Derek > Partfit's book "Reasons and Persons" discusses these questions. > > > I think Parfit is wrong on this, and I vaguely remember having thought that > it was that error which prevents him to see the FPI. I thought that he would > have grasped the SWE, he would have understood (as I think you do) that such > a personal identity notion (distinguishing the two comp notion referred > above) makes not much sense. > I might take a further look. > > Bruno > > > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
