On 30 Jun 2014, at 02:14, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 June 2014 12:03, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 25 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR wrote:
On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for
consciousness, or for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the
argument above, makes that role very mysterious, so much that it is
not clear why we could still say yes to the doctor in virtue of
correct digital rendering.
You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use
matter to make your brain prosthesis.
Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be
you, so if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital
copy, you really do die. While in comp the digital copy is you, by
definition.
?? Comp is the theory that it will be you after the doctor gives you
a prothesis for your brain (plus some other assumptions). It will
be you even after you are duplicated (though it's troubling for JKC
that "you" is both singular and plural).
Yes, that's right. And primitive materialism would distinguish
between two identical versions of you, if only because they occupy
different positions (and due to no-cloning). So a PM copy could only
ever be a "copy that thinks it's you", while a comp copy would be
one that actually is you (assuming comp is correct, of course).
I don't think "comp" necessarily includes the idea that the copy
would be you, just that the copy would be conscious in the same way
as you.
Then you are using "comp" in a different sense than in the UDA. I mean
that if the copy is conscious in the same way as you, but still is not
you (which is often argued with the teleportation without
annihilation), then you would not say that you survive in the usual
clinical sense of surviving from the first person perspective. The
other guy would only be a well done impostor and you would say "No
thanks" to the doctor.
Obviously it is *necessary* that the copy be conscious if it is also
you, but whether it is *sufficient* is a further argument in the
philosophy of personal identity. I think it is sufficient, but not
everyone agrees. Derek Partfit's book "Reasons and Persons"
discusses these questions.
I think Parfit is wrong on this, and I vaguely remember having thought
that it was that error which prevents him to see the FPI. I thought
that he would have grasped the SWE, he would have understood (as I
think you do) that such a personal identity notion (distinguishing the
two comp notion referred above) makes not much sense.
I might take a further look.
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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