RE: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

Sat, 12 Jul 2014 20:30:07 -0700 

 

 

From: [email protected] 
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LizR
Sent: Saturday, July 12, 2014 7:53 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

 

 

 

On 13 July 2014 08:27, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List 
<[email protected]> wrote:

 

Or… perhaps it could it be like the mythical snake eating its tail.

By, invoking retro-causality

 

Brent isn't invoking retro-causality, but circular explanation. As he was at 
pains to point out to me, the arrows are explanatory, NOT causal.

 

I wasn’t suggesting he was, and apologize if you mistook, pure conjecture – on 
my part -- for being a misunderstanding of what he said. In truth I am agnostic 
on reality, realizing clearly that I operate in some relative degree of 
ignorance. I also however like conjecture… and airships too J (the steam punk 
esthetic)

A question for you… 

At some point doesn’t the search for a base level of fundamental reality lead 
you into an endless recursion or an arbitrary assignment of some, non-reducible 
fundamental  quality to some entity, whether this be particle or pure math. 

 

 

 

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