On 12 Jul 2014, at 19:34, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>> If there are two (and there are) why didn't Bruno Marchal ask
what cities John Clark will see from *a* 1p?
>>> That is the 3p view *on* the future 1-views.
>> The? why not *a* future 1-view
> Because as you just agree above, there are 2 futures first person
perspectives,
If there are two (and there are) then *a* future first person
perspective is Moscow AND *a* future first person perspective is
Washington. If there are two (and there are) then there is no such
thing as *the* future first person perspective.
Of course there is. You know when in Helsinki, (as a comp believer)
that you will survive, and you expect (with that comp relative
certainty) that you will drink a cup of coffee in some city, which can
only be Moscow, or Washington.
(I add to the protocol a free coffee in each city for the courageous
teletransporter(s)).
I guess that if you accept my invitation to Helsinki, the pronoun
"you" will not make problem at least up to Helsinki.
So in Helsinki, I might ask you just this: what do you expect when
pushing the button, asking from what do you expect about the evolution
of your subjective life, like the one you describe in the personal
diary (futures diaries).
Do you expect to die, or to vanish? No. that would contradict step 0.
Do you expect feeling mysteriously in both cities, drinking a mixture
of russian and american coffee?
Can you be sure that, after having push the button, you will drink a
russian coffee? Imagine that you are *sure* that you will drink a cup
of coffee after pushing the button. Then you push the button, and I
ask my colleague to interview the copy in washington. that copy has
the memory of having been sure that after pushing the button, she
would drink russian coffee. that copy has the memory of pushing the
button, and opening the door, and getting american coffee.
Her first person experience is the one of having bet on russian
coffee, and experiencing now only american coffee.
She can intellectually imagine and believe in her copy in Moscow, but
that is not what she experienced, and given that the question was
about that experience, she knows now that she was wrong.
> Are you not just contradicting yourself
NO.
>>> The answer will be "W and M". But that is specifically not what
is asked to the guy in Helsinki. He is
>> John Clark hates pronouns!
> Come on. "He" refers to "the guy in Helsinki"
And exactly as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal continues to use
the phrase "the guy in Helsinki" without explaining if that means
someone who remembers bring in Helsinki and being a guy, or if it
means a guy who is currently experiencing Helsinki.
The context, that you avoid, made it clear.
You try hard to misunderstand something that you understand very well,
all this to avoid step 4.
> We have agree on all the use of pronouns.
LIKE HELL WE HAVE!
> As you believe in comp [...]
I do NOT believe in "comp"!!!! I don't even know what the damn
thing means and you don't either,
You believe in comp, as it is the step zero of the UDA.
Don't confude comp and the consequence of comp that I try to explain
to you. Your reason to be stuck in step 3 did not convince anybody,
and are ridiculous, as you keep avoiding the 1/3 distinction at the
precise palce you claim there is an ambiguity.
your silly little homespun word has no consistent definition. You
say it just means agreeing to be duplicated but then you insist that
according to "comp" there is one and only one unique future that
"you" have and its grand title is " *The* future 1p".
No. It is a plural. In the 10-iterated WM duplication, you get 2^10
unique future-1ps. The 1ps are all unique, in the 1p views, with their
own personal diaries, with an explicit history like WWWWWMMWMM. No
algorithm could have predicted that *personal subjective experience".
You said "I will live them all", but all of them, looking at their
diary, refute that proposition.
> at the moment he makes the asked prediction, and thus before he
pushes on the button. [...] you know that when you push on the
button, you will [...]
And exactly as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal is unable to speak
about the nature of personal identity without using lots of personal
pronouns even though the hypothetical situation involved was
specifically designed to challenge conventional ideas of personal
identity.
UDA offers simple 3p definition of the 3p and 1p pronouns, that even
kids understand.
AUDA offers purely arithmetical definition for the 3p notion, and then
take the Theaetetus' definition for the 1p notion, making it definable
(or meta-definable) in arithmetical terms, and also prove it non
definable by the machines.
Then the goal is the prediction of event, like pushing a button, and
making some measurement.
Here we have a machine that can make exact copies of people and yet
Bruno Marchal continues to use personal pronouns in exactly the same
way as always as if the existence of such machines didn't call into
question things that we don't need to give a second thought about
today.
Just read the posts, or the paper, or the book(s). You are the one who
dismiss a distinction to claim an ambiguity.
> And speaking of predictions John Clark predicts that when Bruno
Marchal states the question in the next post it will be filled with
words that are ambiguous in a world with duplicating machines, words
like "I" and "he" and "you". John Clark further predicts that it
will contain phrases like "the Helsinki Man" without having made
clear if that means remembering being a man in Helsinki or if it
means a man currently experiencing Helsinki
> Unfair remark. I told you since the begining that the prediction
is asked to the Helsinki man, when he is in Helsinki
I don't care when you ask, I want to know who you're asking. I want
to know what you mean by "the Helsinki man".
? (it is you, John Clark, having accepted to go to Helsinki and to
push on that button). the question of prediction is always asked
BEFORE we push on the button, and, by the definition given of first
person, the confirmation or refutation of the prediction is asked on
all copies.
example: if in Helsinki you (John Clark, the guy I send this post to,
arriving at Helsinki by plane, etc.) predict I will dring an american
coffe with proba 100%, then I will go in Moscow to get my
counterexample (by definition) of your prediction/ Sorry John, here in
Moscow, we just don't have american coffe, yopur bet was wrong. If at
this stage you say "But i know that I am also in Washington drinking
american coffee, I will reply: "no John, you can believe this, but you
can't know this. You make a confusion between belief and knowledge,
which is indeed a confusion between 3p and 1p.
> the confirmation of success of the prediction is asked to each
copies (that is, the helsinki man, when he arrive at Moscow).
To John Clark that sure sounds like "the Helsinki man" is anyone who
remembers being a man in Helsinki; and Bruno Marchal has already
said that "he" refers to the Helsinki man, therefore after the
duplication Bruno Marchal cannot continue to refer to "he" without
creating mountains of ambiguity.
We have agree many times that both copies are genuine older helsinki
man. You invent ambiguities where there are none.
You seem to have difficulties to grasp that from the 1p view, the view
are unique, even if there are many 1p views, when seen from the out of
the tele-box observer.
> The algorithm is only asked to find a predictive algorithm on its
first person experience.
Forget finding the answer, as John Clark predicted Bruno Marchal
can't even explain exactly what the question is without using
ambiguous personal pronouns.
Read the "amoeba secret". I explain this without any difficulties
since the age of ten.
The only technical difficulty was in understanding conceptually how a
finite entity can "name" itself in the 3p, but at the age of 16 I
understood Gödel's solution, based on the D"X" = "XX" method, itself
coming from Cantor, Dubois-Raymond, ...).
You can take the arithmetical Hypostases as a general theory of
pronouns, it is my specialty. The mathematical theory of indexical.
But prove John Clark wrong;
It has been done many times, but you change your strategy in circle.
after all pronouns were created for convenience not because they
were absolutely necessary, so if they are not being used to state
what is supposed to be proven as John Clark says then just stop
using pronouns; just tell John Clark exactly what the question is
without using all those goddamn personal pronouns.
Just ask John Clark to answer the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 -
iterated multiplication experience.
I multiply John Clark 24 times per second (24) during 1h30 (60 * 90),
into as many copies can be sent in front of one of the 2^(16180 *
10000) possible images on a screen with 16180 * 10000 pixels which can
only be black or white each.
What can John Clark, before pushing the button, expect about the first
person experience that John Clark will live, and will describe in his
personal diary after pushing the starting multiplication button and
wait for 1h30?
Is John Clark, or any machines, assuming comp of course, reasonably
entitled to predict for John Clark most probable first person future:
- John Clark will experience (1) seeing all movies (at once),
- John Clark will experience a black and white movie (perhaps quite
avant-garde),
- John Clark will experience the always black movie,
- John Clark will experience the always white movie,
- John Clark will experience seeing all movies, but not at once, so
that John Clark can't predict which one in particular John Clark will
feel in his personal consciousness stream),
- A (silent) Hitchcock movie,
- A (silent) Hitchcock movie with greek subtitles,
- A random movie (white noise),
-
?
By definition of the "first person", or "experience", the verification
is made by comparing the prediction (done of course before the button
pushing) and the content of all diaries, or any non biased sample of
them.
Bruno
John K Clark
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