On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Of course there is. You know when in Helsinki, (as a comp believer)
>

John Clark is NOT a "comp" believer.

 > what do you expect about the evolution of your subjective life,
>

There are now 2 , so which subjective life?

> like the one you describe in the personal diary
>

There are now 2 diaries just as there are now 2 yous.

> Do you expect to die, or to vanish? No. that would contradict step 0.
>

Why did Bruno Marchal use the personal pronoun "you" in the above sentence
that attempts to explain the nature of personal identity? Because otherwise
the ideas expressed would be exposed as vacuous.  Bruno Marchal is simply
asserting early in the "proof" what Bruno Marchal is attempting to prove.

> Her first person experience is [...]
>

Which first person experience?

> You believe in comp
>

Nobody believes in "comp" because nobody knows what it means, especially
you.

> UDA offers simple 3p definition of the 3p and 1p pronouns,
>

Well good for uda.

> AUDA offers purely arithmetical definition
>

Well good for auda and uda.

> for the 3p notion, and then take the Theaetetus' definition for the 1p
> notion
>

Well good for Plato even though he was a ignoramus by today's standards; a
hillbilly schoolboy knows more about how the world works.

> the question of prediction is always asked BEFORE we push on the button
>

John Clark isn't interested in when the question was asked, and right now
John Clark isn't even interested what the answer is. John Clark just wants
to know exactly and unambiguously what the question is.

 > if in Helsinki you (John Clark, the guy I send this post to, arriving at
> Helsinki by plane, etc.) predict I will [...]
>

Why did Bruno Marchal use the personal pronoun "I" in the above sentence
that attempts to  explain the nature of personal identity? Because
otherwise the ideas expressed would be exposed as vacuous.   Bruno Marchal
is simply asserting early in the "proof" what Bruno Marchal is attempting
to prove.

> We have agree many times that both copies are genuine older helsinki man.
>

Yes indeed that has been agreed to, but then in the next breath Bruno
Marchal will say that according to "comp" even though the Helsinki Man will
certainly see Moscow there is less than a 100% chance that the Helsinki man
will see Moscow. And that is why John Clark doesn't understand what "the
Helsinki Man" means and that is why even Bruno Marchal doesn't understand
what "comp" means.

> from the 1p view, the view are unique, even if there are many 1p views,
>

And that is the idea that is simply asserted into the proof, there is
something mysterious that makes one and only one of those views unique ; so
it's little wonder that in later steps it is proven. John Clark will admit
that asserting what is attempted to be proven does leads to proofs that are
simpler and shorter.

> Just ask John Clark to answer the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 -
> iterated multiplication experience. What can John Clark, before pushing the
> button, expect about the first person experience that John Clark  will live
>

John Clark will have  2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 first person
experiences as viewed from the 1P and NONE OF THEM ARE UNIQUE, there is no
such thing as  " *the* first person experience that John Clark  will live".
And there is another problem, ALL views are views of the present, nobody
can view the future, guesses can be made about what things will happen but
there is no "future 1P".

> By definition of the "first person", or "experience", the verification is
> made by comparing the prediction [blah blah]
>

And that is perhaps the most serious error of all, the idea the the sense
of self has something to do with the success rate a theory has at
predicting the future.

  John K Clark

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