On 17 Jul 2014, at 14:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Computationalism is necessarily consistent,
I am not sure we can know that, at least in any reasonably justifiable
way.
but may not be complete except in nearly infinite domains.
It is incomplete with respect to arithmetical truth, and all
geographical and historical (including the futures) truth, but it has
to be complete, amazingly enough, on the physical truth, or if you
prefer on the core non-geographical truth. Those are the same for all
machine (and even a lot of non-machine) observer and is supposed to
give the measure defined (or not) on the "computations seen from the
1p view". I could add nuances, but that would be quickly very
technical. "complete" can take different senses, even in mathematical
logic alone, and it is harder to define with respect to "reality" or
"god" or "everything" or "whatever".
Bruno
Richard
On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 16 Jul 2014, at 20:43, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 1:07 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> John Clark is NOT a "comp" believer.
> This contradicts the fact that you are OK with step 0, and step
1, and step 2.
I'm not surprised. I've long ago forgotten what those steps were
This might explains your difficulty.
but I do know that If one starts with any contradictory concept,
such as "comp" for example,
Computationalism is contradictory? What is the contradiction?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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