So therefore, there is a 'pre-existing' program, embedded in comp, in maths, 
that emulates a 'conscious observer' or have I driven your explanation, into a 
ditch??

With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of computation, we 
already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs the emulation. Then with 
comp, it can be shown that this is indeed done in a way such that you could not 
make the difference from your inside first person points of view.


I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but "emulation" 
and "computation" are concept definable in arithmetic, or equivalent. 


It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science. 


Bruno

 
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Fri, Jul 18, 2014 6:56 am
Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch




On 17 Jul 2014, at 21:00, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


 
Whom do you anticipate performing the emulation? 
 
Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist 
theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer 
emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument.
 
 







With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of computation, we 
already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs the emulation. Then with 
comp, it can be shown that this is indeed done in a way such that you could not 
make the difference from your inside first person points of view.


I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but "emulation" 
and "computation" are concept definable in arithmetic, or equivalent. 


It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science. 


Bruno










 
 
 
 
 
-----Original Message-----
 From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
 To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Thu, Jul 17, 2014 1:00 pm
 Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch
 
 
 

 
 
On 17 Jul 2014, at 18:37, John Clark wrote:
 

 
On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> Computationalism is contradictory?
 
 
 
 

   No. Computationalism is not contradictory, but "comp" is.
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
What difference do you se between comp and computationalism?
 

 
 
Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist 
theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer 
emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument.
 

 
 
You agreed on step 0, so that is enough to say that either you believe in comp, 
or that you find it enough plasuible to start reasoning assuming it, like in 
the UDA.
 

 
 
I can understand that you don't believe in the *consequences* of comp given 
that you stop at the step 3 (without anyone understanding why though).
 

 
 
To claim that comp is different from computationalism is ... weird. Tell me the 
difference. I doubt you will find anyone, except that I provide a weaker 
version than usual (through the existence of a substitution level, without 
putting any bound on it), and more precise, by defining "computer" with Church 
thesis.
 

 
 
Got the feeling you never have read any papers I wrote. You might have judged 
before studying. You lost me completely in invoking a difference between comp 
and computationalism. (and it does contradict your agreement with step one, 
which by definition makes you understand what comp is).
 

 
 
Bruno
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
  John K Clark
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 


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