Ok, thanks. Sounds very complex. It also comes to mind that perhaps, all equations, all axioms, all programs' exist on Platonic space, or the realm of discernible numbers. The easiest way for me to imagine this occurring would be a retrodiction universe, in which the future informs the past. John Cramer, professor emeritus, of the university of Washington is very big on this. If I remember correctly, so is Jack Sarfatti, but I don't know if his version is the same as Cramer's? The future, the distant future somehow influences the present. Maybe. if true, the future is and has always been, Platonic? A database of unimaginable sophistication. A database with 'live' agents to link relation to relation.
No, you are right, except that your way of talking might be misleading. All you need to accept is the axiom of Robinson arithmetic. Then the infinitely many programs and their executions exist in the same sense that prime numbers or relatively prime numbers exist. And the reasoning shows that we don't need any other notion of existence. So the physical laws emerge as appearances in machines' mind and consciousness, and this in a completely precise ay, making it possible to test the computationalist hypothesis. Bruno -----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> To: everything-list <[email protected]> Sent: Fri, Jul 18, 2014 12:24 pm Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 18 Jul 2014, at 16:54, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: So therefore, there is a 'pre-existing' program, embedded in comp, in maths, that emulates a 'conscious observer' or have I driven your explanation, into a ditch?? No, you are right, except that your way of talking might be misleading. All you need to accept is the axiom of Robinson arithmetic. Then the infinitely many programs and their executions exist in the same sense that prime numbers or relatively prime numbers exist. And the reasoning shows that we don't need any other notion of existence. So the physical laws emerge as appearances in machines' mind and consciousness, and this in a completely precise ay, making it possible to test the computationalist hypothesis. Bruno With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of computation, we already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs the emulation. Then with comp, it can be shown that this is indeed done in a way such that you could not make the difference from your inside first person points of view. I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but "emulation" and "computation" are concept definable in arithmetic, or equivalent. It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science. Bruno -----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> To: everything-list <[email protected]> Sent: Fri, Jul 18, 2014 6:56 am Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 17 Jul 2014, at 21:00, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: Whom do you anticipate performing the emulation? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. With Church thesis, or with Turing or Church definition of computation, we already know that a tiny part of arithmetic performs the emulation. Then with comp, it can be shown that this is indeed done in a way such that you could not make the difference from your inside first person points of view. I know that only computer scientists seems to be aware of this, but "emulation" and "computation" are concept definable in arithmetic, or equivalent. It is amazing, without doubt, but part of standard computer science. Bruno -----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> To: everything-list <[email protected]> Sent: Thu, Jul 17, 2014 1:00 pm Subject: Re: Selecting your future branch On 17 Jul 2014, at 18:37, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > Computationalism is contradictory? No. Computationalism is not contradictory, but "comp" is. What difference do you se between comp and computationalism? Comp is used as an abbreviation of computationalism, or CTM (computationalist theory of the mind). it is basically the assumption that the brain is computer emulable. That is detailed in the step 0 of the UD Argument. You agreed on step 0, so that is enough to say that either you believe in comp, or that you find it enough plasuible to start reasoning assuming it, like in the UDA. I can understand that you don't believe in the *consequences* of comp given that you stop at the step 3 (without anyone understanding why though). To claim that comp is different from computationalism is ... weird. Tell me the difference. I doubt you will find anyone, except that I provide a weaker version than usual (through the existence of a substitution level, without putting any bound on it), and more precise, by defining "computer" with Church thesis. Got the feeling you never have read any papers I wrote. You might have judged before studying. You lost me completely in invoking a difference between comp and computationalism. (and it does contradict your agreement with step one, which by definition makes you understand what comp is). Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
