On 24 Jul 2014, at 04:32, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:36:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
PGC,
I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he
is saying.
My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p
correct.
Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p.
When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be
correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can
learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe
comp is correct in some sense.
Your sum up is misleading.
I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to
argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding
that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be
refutable, and I give a test.
No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct.
What do you mean by understand comp to be correct? There are plenty
of Strong AI people who think that they understand comp to be correct.
It is a bet. An assumption. They can understand its meaning, but they
can justify its truth. So you are right or wrong according to the
sense you give to "understand".
But we can assume it, and deduce from there.
People don't think that they are assuming it for no reason, they
think that they understand that mechanisms in the brain create
consciousness, and that consciousness is a mathematical model within
a program.
Nobody can understand how a mechanism can get conscious. We can only
hope that a sufficiently precise description of oneself ([]p) will
preserves the soul ([]p & p), that is, that the substitution will
preserve the relation with truth.
Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp.
Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the
definition of Theaetetus of knowledge,
Which I don't, but ok, I think that what you are proposing that we
accept is that knowledge is something like justified true belief, or
[]p & p.
Yes. It works for the goal of solving the comp mind-body problem, but
of course, it does not work for the mundane beliefs and possible
knowledge (which belongs to another topic).
with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the
idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical
consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the
machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p
experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption.
But people do think that their 1p can be defined by 3p terms.
If you read the literature, this is the object of a very long debate,
which might begin with Xenophane (about 6th century before JC) up to
today. It is here that comp provides a quite interesting new light, as
it shows that both the modern (who accept Theaetetus) and the ancients
(who want knowledge being non propositional and non natural) get
reconciliate:
Like the modern, we can define, for ideally correct machine, knowledge
by the theaetetus method applied to Gödel provability predicate, and
this, unlike the moderns believe, lead to a non propositional and non
natural notion of knower.
They think that when they experience X, it is merely the firing of
neuron ensemble Y.
That is the identity thesis which makes no sense, neither with comp,
nor with Everett QM.
In their understanding, X is merely a label that represents Y.
Daniel Dennett certainly has no problem 'understanding' that his 1p
is nothing but 3p.
Leading him to eliminate somehow consciousness. That is not quite
serious.
This is where I see, if I'm being generous, some inconsistency in
the assertion that "1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the
machine itself,",
refering to people who are wrong (with respect to comp) is not an
argument against comp, or the Theaetetus.
or if less generous I would say there is deep hypocrisy or self-
deception in holding the contradictory positions that 1) Bruno
understands that 1p can ultimately be defined in 3p terms,
It cannot, so I certainly do not believe it. "[]p & p" cannot be
expressed in the language of the machine.
2) Machines cannot do 1, and 3) Bruno could be a machine. It is even
more suspect since your refuting of my position hinges on 1 and 2
both being true, when it is clear to me that any compromise of 1 and
2 weaken 2 so that it has no meaning.
You miss that "[]p & p" is not a description. We can come back on this
when we are enough familiar with some results in mathematical logic.
The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false.
It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy
and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those
experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths.
Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p
objects, but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share
some definition with them and agree on that point. The soul of any
machine, is not a machine.
This too is a sleight of hand. If the soul of a machine is produced
by the machine,
It is not produced by the machine. As far as I know, the machine only
filters consciousness.
then how can you say that the soul is not a machine? To me, it makes
mores sense to say that machines are alienated, reduced,
destructively compressed representations of soul-like phenomena.
There is no cause for a machine to represent its interior as
anything fundamentally different than its exterior,
That is what is precisely false.
all that the math indicates as far as I can tell is that some of the
qualities which we expect to see in arithmetic are hidden.
Arithmetic can only suggest a private exterior as an interior, not a
true aesthetic presence such as the flavor of a carrot. The simpler,
and more wondrous explanation is that it is the flavor of the carrot
which is irreducible and direct,
Comp makes it irreducible, but not direct, although comp explains why
it feels "direct".
while the mechanistic extraction is a generic, skeletal ingredient.
That's the case for the []p, but not the "[]p & p".
The machine is part of the soul...the part in which souls reflect
each other as a neutral coordinate system and constrain their
appearance through a spatiotemporal or form-functional entropy/
normalization.
Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect
created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live
in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger,
tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc.
The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p & p,
and it has no 3p description.
What is comp but a 3p description?
Not at all. Comp is a belief (or hope, fear, ...) that a person can
have. It is the hope that they will survive intact from a digital
functional substitution. It involves some 3p description of oneself,
but comp itself is not a description. It is a statement involving a
description and some (possible) truth.
I think this is another sleight of hand. If we talk about 1p in
these quasi-mystical terms of being a machine's soul, we forget that
we are still viewing 1p through a 3p lens,
Well, we have too, if we want do science. Science is done entirely at
the 3p, even when doing science on the 1p.
and any suggestion that it could go the other way is denounced
immediately as solipsism.
Yes, because using the 1p consists in referring to something non
communicable, and thus is near the solipsist doctrine.
The 1p is naturally solipsist, but it does not need to believe in the
*doctrine* of solipsism.
At all times, comp is pushing 1p into an isolated bubble within the
unquestioned supremacy of 3p arithmetic truths.
Yes, we tend to believe in prime numbers and things like that.
But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp. That is why we, the
numbers, have a theology. Right at the start.
Are you saying that all people are born with a theology?
All people, all machines, all aliens, etc. yes. All correct referring
entities obey to G and G*, and are confronted with the same
intensional nuances. Only the nature and detail structures of the
"[]p" differs.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
