On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> PGC, >> >> I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is >> saying. >> My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. >> > > Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask > him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to > vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and > saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. > > > Your sum up is misleading. > > I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue > for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is > vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a > test. > > No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. But we can assume > it, and deduce from there. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. > > Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition > of Theaetetus of knowledge, with believability modelize by provability > (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we > get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p > terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from > inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. > > > > The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a > great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then > it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a > universe of arithmetic truths. > > > Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, > but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition > with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a > machine. > > > > Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the > world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer > program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a > moment of peace, etc. > > > The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p & p, and it > has no 3p description. But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp. That is why > we, the numbers, have a theology. Right at the start. > Bruno, Didn't I just read today a statement of yours that the soul in 3p is its description.? Richard > > Bruno > > > > > Craig > > >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Craig, >>>>> >>>>> You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I >>>>> don't do that, ever. >>>>> But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting >>>>> for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly >>>>> assert >>>>> that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first >>>>> person >>>>> point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I >>>> find your paragraph rather confusing. >>>> Richard >>>> >>> >>> Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in "comp is >>> wrong/bad to believe for machine". >>> >>> For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails >>> set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such >>> machine to assert things like: "What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much >>> more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false." - >>> Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even >>> much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some >>> 3p verifiable way. >>> >>> Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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