On Friday, July 25, 2014 9:15:10 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Jul 2014, at 04:32, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:36:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > >> PGC, > >> > >> I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he > >> is saying. > >> My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p > >> correct. > >> > >> Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. > >> When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be > >> correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can > >> learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe > >> comp is correct in some sense. > > > > Your sum up is misleading. > > > > I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to > > argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding > > that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be > > refutable, and I give a test. > > > > No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. > > > > What do you mean by understand comp to be correct? There are plenty > > of Strong AI people who think that they understand comp to be correct. > > It is a bet. An assumption. They can understand its meaning, but they > can justify its truth. So you are right or wrong according to the > sense you give to "understand". >
Then it's a bet that comp is false also. I can understand why it's meaning is incomplete and its truth can only be trivial rather than profound. It's a bet that knowledge can exist also. All knowledge can be a bet. > > > > > > > > But we can assume it, and deduce from there. > > > > People don't think that they are assuming it for no reason, they > > think that they understand that mechanisms in the brain create > > consciousness, and that consciousness is a mathematical model within > > a program. > > Nobody can understand how a mechanism can get conscious. We can only > hope that a sufficiently precise description of oneself ([]p) will > preserves the soul ([]p & p), that is, that the substitution will > preserve the relation with truth. > I can understand the opposite though. Consciousness can appear mechanical from a distance if consciousness is primary. There can't be any substitution, but the relation is preserved automatically. > > > > > > Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. > > > > Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the > > definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, > > > > Which I don't, but ok, I think that what you are proposing that we > > accept is that knowledge is something like justified true belief, or > > []p & p. > > Yes. It works for the goal of solving the comp mind-body problem, but > of course, it does not work for the mundane beliefs and possible > knowledge (which belongs to another topic). > Is the comp mind-body problem one which doesn't include the hard problem? > > > > > > > > > with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the > > idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical > > consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the > > machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p > > experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. > > > > But people do think that their 1p can be defined by 3p terms. > > If you read the literature, this is the object of a very long debate, > which might begin with Xenophane (about 6th century before JC) up to > today. It is here that comp provides a quite interesting new light, as > it shows that both the modern (who accept Theaetetus) and the ancients > (who want knowledge being non propositional and non natural) get > reconciliate: > > Like the modern, we can define, for ideally correct machine, knowledge > by the theaetetus method applied to Gödel provability predicate, and > this, unlike the moderns believe, lead to a non propositional and non > natural notion of knower. > > > > > > They think that when they experience X, it is merely the firing of > > neuron ensemble Y. > > That is the identity thesis which makes no sense, neither with comp, > nor with Everett QM. > > > > > > In their understanding, X is merely a label that represents Y. > > Daniel Dennett certainly has no problem 'understanding' that his 1p > > is nothing but 3p. > > Leading him to eliminate somehow consciousness. That is not quite > serious. > It is to him though. If comp were true, wouldn't he have to be an example of a machine who understands his 1p consciousness as 3p? > > > > > > > This is where I see, if I'm being generous, some inconsistency in > > the assertion that "1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the > > machine itself,", > > refering to people who are wrong (with respect to comp) is not an > argument against comp, or the Theaetetus. > Sure it's an argument, if comp is going to claim that 1) machines tend to believe X, when 2) some people do not believe X, and 3) all people are machines. > > > > or if less generous I would say there is deep hypocrisy or self- > > deception in holding the contradictory positions that 1) Bruno > > understands that 1p can ultimately be defined in 3p terms, > > It cannot, so I certainly do not believe it. "[]p & p" cannot be > expressed in the language of the machine. > But you are able to argue either side of the issue, so you can nominally conceive that the reality of your 1p could be a 3p mechanism beyond your knowledge. I think that the typical worldview for modern Westerners is in fact that they are some process that their brain is performing. > > > > 2) Machines cannot do 1, and 3) Bruno could be a machine. It is even > > more suspect since your refuting of my position hinges on 1 and 2 > > both being true, when it is clear to me that any compromise of 1 and > > 2 weaken 2 so that it has no meaning. > > > > > You miss that "[]p & p" is not a description. We can come back on this > when we are enough familiar with some results in mathematical logic. > I'm not seeing how that relates. > > > > > > > > > >> > >> The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. > >> It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy > >> and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those > >> experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths. > > > > Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p > > objects, but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share > > some definition with them and agree on that point. The soul of any > > machine, is not a machine. > > > > This too is a sleight of hand. If the soul of a machine is produced > > by the machine, > > It is not produced by the machine. As far as I know, the machine only > filters consciousness. > Then why would the machine be necessary for (unfiltered) consciousness? Why would comp be true? > > > > > > then how can you say that the soul is not a machine? To me, it makes > > mores sense to say that machines are alienated, reduced, > > destructively compressed representations of soul-like phenomena. > > There is no cause for a machine to represent its interior as > > anything fundamentally different than its exterior, > > That is what is precisely false. > > > > > > all that the math indicates as far as I can tell is that some of the > > qualities which we expect to see in arithmetic are hidden. > > Arithmetic can only suggest a private exterior as an interior, not a > > true aesthetic presence such as the flavor of a carrot. The simpler, > > and more wondrous explanation is that it is the flavor of the carrot > > which is irreducible and direct, > > Comp makes it irreducible, but not direct, although comp explains why > it feels "direct". > If it can't explain what 'feel' is, then we can't put much weight on the question of why it feels direct. > > > > > > while the mechanistic extraction is a generic, skeletal ingredient. > > That's the case for the []p, but not the "[]p & p". > I don't see why it wouldn't still be skeletal, as & p has only a truth relation, not an aesthetic presence. > > > > > > The machine is part of the soul...the part in which souls reflect > > each other as a neutral coordinate system and constrain their > > appearance through a spatiotemporal or form-functional entropy/ > > normalization. > > > > > > > > > > > >> Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect > >> created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live > >> in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, > >> tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc. > > > > The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p & p, > > and it has no 3p description. > > > > What is comp but a 3p description? > > Not at all. Comp is a belief (or hope, fear, ...) that a person can > have. It is the hope that they will survive intact from a digital > functional substitution. It involves some 3p description of oneself, > but comp itself is not a description. It is a statement involving a > description and some (possible) truth. > I was being informal, I meant that comp is based on the substitutability of a 3p description to create 1p experience. > > > > > > I think this is another sleight of hand. If we talk about 1p in > > these quasi-mystical terms of being a machine's soul, we forget that > > we are still viewing 1p through a 3p lens, > > Well, we have too, if we want do science. Science is done entirely at > the 3p, even when doing science on the 1p. > Still, we can do science on the 1p & p rather than the 1p (3p & p & 1p). > > > and any suggestion that it could go the other way is denounced > > immediately as solipsism. > > Yes, because using the 1p consists in referring to something non > communicable, and thus is near the solipsist doctrine. > The 1p is naturally solipsist, but it does not need to believe in the > *doctrine* of solipsism. > The 1p does not have to be solipsist. We can and do share experiences, qualia, etc. Communication is not always necessary, especially with future neural tech. > > > > > At all times, comp is pushing 1p into an isolated bubble within the > > unquestioned supremacy of 3p arithmetic truths. > > Yes, we tend to believe in prime numbers and things like that. > It's fine to believe in prime numbers, but that belief doesn't justify any particular relation with consciousness. If consciousness is fundamental, prime numbers can still be discovered within it. > > > > > > > But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp. That is why we, the > > numbers, have a theology. Right at the start. > > > > Are you saying that all people are born with a theology? > > > All people, all machines, all aliens, etc. yes. All correct referring > entities obey to G and G*, and are confronted with the same > intensional nuances. Only the nature and detail structures of the > "[]p" differs. > Even crazy people? Babies? Craig > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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