On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > > PGC, > > I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is > saying. > My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. >
Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths. Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc. Craig > > > On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy < > [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected] >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>>> Craig, >>>> >>>> You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I >>>> don't do that, ever. >>>> But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting >>>> for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly >>>> assert >>>> that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first >>>> person >>>> point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I >>> find your paragraph rather confusing. >>> Richard >>> >> >> Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in "comp is >> wrong/bad to believe for machine". >> >> For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails >> set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such >> machine to assert things like: "What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much >> more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false." - >> Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even >> much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some >> 3p verifiable way. >> >> Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
