On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 23 Jul 2014, at 21:21, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > > > On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >>> >>> PGC, >>> >>> I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is >>> saying. >>> My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p >>> correct. >>> >> >> Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I >> ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he >> seems to vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more >> correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some >> sense. >> >> >> Your sum up is misleading. >> >> I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue >> for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is >> vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a >> test. >> >> No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. But we can assume >> it, and deduce from there. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. >> >> Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the >> definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, with believability modelize by >> provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the mind-body >> problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p cannot be defined >> in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the machine can know that, both >> from inside 1p experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. >> >> >> >> The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a >> great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then >> it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a >> universe of arithmetic truths. >> >> >> Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, >> but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition >> with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a >> machine. >> >> >> >> Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the >> world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer >> program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a >> moment of peace, etc. >> >> >> The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p & p, and it >> has no 3p description. But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp. That is why >> we, the numbers, have a theology. Right at the start. >> > > Bruno, Didn't I just read today a statement of yours that the soul in 3p > is its description.? Richard > > > Hi Richard, > > I only said that the 3p self is its description. It is the body, as seen > as a "code" written in "nature's" language, or anything from which you can > build that body (like the "Gödel number" sent by a teletransporter device). > It is the "[]p", and can be seen as an object in arithmetic (or even in > physics, temporarily). > > The soul, on the contrary is defined with the Theaetetus method, []p & p, > and appears to be not describable in any 3p way. I will come back on > explaining why this is so. I have already alluded to the explanation. From > scratch it is long and pretty technical. > > Bruno > > > Thank you Bruno for explaining the distinction between self and soul. But it seems to me that if the soul can only be 1p, is there a soul for every different 1p person in the 3p self. I would prefer one soul, and even one person. Richard > > > > >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Craig, >>>>>> >>>>>> You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I >>>>>> don't do that, ever. >>>>>> But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting >>>>>> for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly >>>>>> assert >>>>>> that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first >>>>>> person >>>>>> point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I >>>>> find your paragraph rather confusing. >>>>> Richard >>>>> >>>> >>>> Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in "comp is >>>> wrong/bad to believe for machine". >>>> >>>> For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp >>>> entails set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for >>>> such machine to assert things like: "What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm >>>> much more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be >>>> false." - Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense >>>> going even much further: insisting that we believe him, without going >>>> non-comp in some 3p verifiable way. >>>> >>>> Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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