On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:36:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> PGC, >> >> I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is >> saying. >> My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct. >> > > Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask > him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to > vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and > saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense. > > > Your sum up is misleading. > > I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue > for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is > vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a > test. > > No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. >
What do you mean by understand comp to be correct? There are plenty of Strong AI people who think that they understand comp to be correct. > But we can assume it, and deduce from there. > People don't think that they are assuming it for no reason, they think that they understand that mechanisms in the brain create consciousness, and that consciousness is a mathematical model within a program. > Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. > > Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition > of Theaetetus of knowledge, > Which I don't, but ok, I think that what you are proposing that we accept is that knowledge is something like justified true belief, or []p & p. > with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea > case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence > that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and > the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from > reasoning in the comp assumption. > But people do think that their 1p can be defined by 3p terms. They think that when they experience X, it is merely the firing of neuron ensemble Y. In their understanding, X is merely a label that represents Y. Daniel Dennett certainly has no problem 'understanding' that his 1p is nothing but 3p. This is where I see, if I'm being generous, some inconsistency in the assertion that "1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself,", or if less generous I would say there is deep hypocrisy or self-deception in holding the contradictory positions that 1) Bruno understands that 1p can ultimately be defined in 3p terms, 2) Machines cannot do 1, and 3) Bruno could be a machine. It is even more suspect since your refuting of my position hinges on 1 and 2 both being true, when it is clear to me that any compromise of 1 and 2 weaken 2 so that it has no meaning. > > > > The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a > great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then > it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a > universe of arithmetic truths. > > > Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, > but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition > with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a > machine. > This too is a sleight of hand. If the soul of a machine is produced by the machine, then how can you say that the soul is not a machine? To me, it makes mores sense to say that machines are alienated, reduced, destructively compressed representations of soul-like phenomena. There is no cause for a machine to represent its interior as anything fundamentally different than its exterior, all that the math indicates as far as I can tell is that some of the qualities which we expect to see in arithmetic are hidden. Arithmetic can only suggest a private exterior as an interior, not a true aesthetic presence such as the flavor of a carrot. The simpler, and more wondrous explanation is that it is the flavor of the carrot which is irreducible and direct, while the mechanistic extraction is a generic, skeletal ingredient. The machine is part of the soul...the part in which souls reflect each other as a neutral coordinate system and constrain their appearance through a spatiotemporal or form-functional entropy/normalization. > > > Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the > world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer > program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a > moment of peace, etc. > > > The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p & p, and it > has no 3p description. > What is comp but a 3p description? I think this is another sleight of hand. If we talk about 1p in these quasi-mystical terms of being a machine's soul, we forget that we are still viewing 1p through a 3p lens, and any suggestion that it could go the other way is denounced immediately as solipsism. At all times, comp is pushing 1p into an isolated bubble within the unquestioned supremacy of 3p arithmetic truths. > But some 3p meta-descriptions with comp. That is why we, the numbers, have > a theology. Right at the start. > Are you saying that all people are born with a theology? Craig > > Bruno > > > > > Craig > > >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Craig, >>>>> >>>>> You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I >>>>> don't do that, ever. >>>>> But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting >>>>> for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly >>>>> assert >>>>> that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first >>>>> person >>>>> point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I >>>> find your paragraph rather confusing. >>>> Richard >>>> >>> >>> Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in "comp is >>> wrong/bad to believe for machine". >>> >>> For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails >>> set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such >>> machine to assert things like: "What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much >>> more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false." - >>> Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even >>> much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some >>> 3p verifiable way. >>> >>> Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
