On 30 Jul 2014, at 06:22, Kim Jones wrote:
On 30 Jul 2014, at 7:51 am, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
I can't comment on that, "comp" means whatever Bruno wants it to
mean, and that changes from day to day.
Here I respectfully disagree, he seems more or less consistent to
me, give or take the odd ambiguity due to English not being his
first language. But I have to admit that I have yet to grok comp in
its entirety.
Even Bruno himself, by his own admission has yet to grok comp in its
entirety.
If by comp, you mean the hypothesis, I think everybody "grok" comp
pretty well. It is the hypothesis that our bodies activity is the
result of finitary local computable interactions at some level. It is
basically Descartes' mechanism, recasted in the digital realm, and it
is equivalent with the possibility of surviving with a digital
functional brain, or body substitution.
If by comp, you mean the hypothesis and its consequences, then nobody
grok comp in its entirety, nor does anybody grok even just the 3p
arithmetical truth in its entirety. On the contrary, comp explains why
it entals the existence of many infinite things, and non-comp things
play a role in the internal views of machines/numbers.
Actually, I don't think the statement "to grok comp in its entirety"
makes a lot of sense since with something like this, which has at
its heart Gödelian notions of incompleteness and "infinities of
computations" the possibility of tying the whole thing up in one
clever and pretty package seems dubious at best. Comp involves
enormous transdisciplinary or multidisciplinary knowledge. This is
the incredibly hard part for people like Clark who hate to encounter
knowledge fields in which they are out of their depth. John would
prefer that things be rather more neat and that it all conform to
the "laws of physics" as set out in some undergrad text. Wouldn't we
all. Then we could all get back to whatever it was we were doing
before we were rudely interrupted by the somewhat unsettling thought
that matter is immaterial.
Comp is a bit like the theory of evolution (which is based on comp,
actually).
It involves very few basic simple first principles, and shows how
things emerge from them.
On John Clark I am not sure. He is clever and open minded. I think he
is just in a psychological self-deny, for reason of jalousy or because
it has implicate itself to much with the task of showing that I am an
idiot, which I think is his main motivation.
At least he tries this publicly, which is rather exceptional.
John's strategy consists in making only one half of the thought
experiment. He forgets to compare the "prediction he made and wrote in
his diary in Helsinki", with *all* contents of the diaries, enriched
by the result of the self-localization, which resulted from the
experiments. As you notice, young kids can understand that "w & m" get
wrong everywhere, and "w v m" get true everywhere.
In the UDA, that clear third person description of a key part of the
first person experience (getting one bit of information) is all what
is needed to proceed up to the conclusion.
In AUDA, we adopt an even simpler conceptual strategy, we ask the
machine. By Gödel's arithmetization of meta-arithmetic, we get the
nuance enforced from incompleteness, and machine perception of it, we
refine the first person, by "meta" defining it through the Theaetetus
definition of knowledge (accepted by the "modern", according to Gerson).
Bruno is a polymath, a creative thinker and the explorer of a
terrain few are equipped to traverse. He seeks the convergence point
of disparate fields of knowledge and applies a special filter over
them which allows him to see information and data that no one else
sees. This is the very definition of creative perception, something
that is not in the mental toolkit of your average science-mind.
Bruno has invented tools of perception that produce results that
raise eyebrows, yes. I have received the impression that there is
enormous simmering jealousy amongst some (not necessarily on this
list) concerning this ability he has.
Thanks Kim. Well, I feel myself being only an ultra-conservative
Platonist. I have no creativity, amoeba does, the universal machine
does, numbers does. Every one does. The Lôbian numbers are the
universal numbers who understand that.
Comp is obviously going to mean different things to different people,
Indeed. I begun a taxonomy of possible different type of practice, but
it is ... astronomical.
but then this whole story is about the very notion of what a person
is, and whether there in fact exists anything else at all in reality.
This would be oversimplifying. If elementary arithmetic can be
candidate for a TOE, that is due in part that today, this captures
already the sigma_1 complete part of the arithmetical reality, and
with comp, that's structures our ignorance, and the math describing
the corresponding modality is the G and G* discovery "closing" in some
way, the study of the consequences of incompleteness.
As Bruno said to me last night when I was complaining about smug
little atoms: we can't expect to be doing real science if we put our
personal inclinations and preferences ahead of our inquiry. That he
went on to say that in fact this is what we always do anyway -
presumably, even if we don't actually notice this - strikes me as
incredibly perceptive.
Our starting point in all these discussions is someone's perception.
Not facts. Not reason. Not observation. Not canonical scientific
thinking. Someone's perception. Now that is what a person does. They
perceive. That's "seeing" in the very broad sense of seeing with the
mind, meaning seeing with your values, your memories, your
knowledge, your desires, your needs and wants, your preferences and
prejudices. All those things we are supposed to be able to put to
one side when we do science, hardy ha-ha. No such luck. If we could
do that, we wouldn't be real, we wouldn't be persons.
It is worth the try. I am not sure why we wouldn't be person? The
ideally correct machine is schizophrenic enough to me, with the
"internal" conflict between the 3p views and the 1p views.
Bruno
K
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