On 8/4/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2014, at 20:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person after-experiences.
Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie.
> In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry',
Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow and one will not,
nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things were symmetrical there would only be one
person regardless of how many bodies there were; there needs to be a break in symmetry
for the concepts of "you" and "me" to be meaningful. You and I are two different
people because things are unsymmetrical, we both have memories that the other does
not; In the thought experiment things are a little more complicated because the
Helsinki Man has no memories that the Moscow Man (or Washington Man) does not, but the
Moscow Man DOES have memories the Helsinki Man does not, such as the memory of seeing
Moscow.
Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that a person can exist
independently of any memories.
Well, on this list I have regularly claim that the number of (first) person is an open
problem.
Then, it is true that salvia suggests the possibility that there is only one.
But computationalism suggest this too. We would all be the unique abstract person
described by the logic S4Grz, with the '[]' taken as minimal as possible.
What happens with salvia is that you can not only become amnesic (or better dissociated
from your memory but still able to access them, but not having them as personal
memories) but you get the feeling of remembering something that you have always known
and which is quite specific. You can't really come back with that memory. There is a
double amnesia in play: there is an amnesia (of your mundane local self) when going in
there, and there is an amnesia of some aspect of there when coming back.
That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I find this theory
contrary to experience. I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly
did not seem to be the same person as when they could remember things.
Well; look at some people under salvia, and they don't seem the same person as when they
are sober. Well, that is typically true also for alcohol and most string psychotropic.
But in this case, you define by the person in part by its memories. the whole point
here, is that we might be the same person, even with quite different memories. Imagine
the W-guy meeting and falling in love with a muslim girl/man and deciding to become
muslim, and imagine the M-guy meeting and falling in love with a jewish girl/man and
deciding to become israelite, and imagine them both living a full life, and being old.
They would still both be the H-guy. They are the same person, just living different lives.
If you agree with this, it is just normal to consider that we might be the same
person,
I think this is just playing around with the ambiguity of "same". Do I live in the same
house I bought thirty years ago. Yes, I have the deed. No, I've added two rooms, changed
all the floors.
Brent
living different lives. When using salvia, that intuition can be lived from inside, and
it makes people usually more empathic, and more shocked by what humans do to other
humans, without realizing that at some level, all the bad they do is to themselves, and
that they are just blind about who they really are.
I tend to think now that we are indeed the same person, but note that this is not
relevant for UDA, AUDA and the reversal, which let open the questions about "ultimate"
personal identity.
Bruno
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