On 05 Aug 2014, at 01:23, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 7:29 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 8/4/2014 6:15 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 6:37 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 8/3/2014 5:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 7:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person after-
experiences.
Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie.
> In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry',
Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow
and one will not, nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things
were symmetrical there would only be one person regardless of how
many bodies there were; there needs to be a break in symmetry for
the concepts of "you" and "me" to be meaningful. You and I are
two different people because things are unsymmetrical, we both
have memories that the other does not; In the thought experiment
things are a little more complicated because the Helsinki Man has
no memories that the Moscow Man (or Washington Man) does not, but
the Moscow Man DOES have memories the Helsinki Man does not, such
as the memory of seeing Moscow.
Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that
a person can exist independently of any memories.
Perhaps ironically, ISTM this is trivially true if you accept the
conventional neuroscience hypothesis that consciousness emerges
from brain activity. Then, there is some moment after birth when a
baby becomes conscious. At that moment they form their first
memory and exist as a conscious entity without any previous
memories.
How do you know they don't first form a memory and then become
conscious?
What does "they" mean before consciousness?
The same as in "At that moment they form their first memory..."
The lump of molecules? If we allow for this broader definition of
memory, then any form of stigmergy counts as memories and this
discussion becoms a bit moot...
Or more likely the person, in the sense of personality, doesn't not
just come into being like switching on a light; rather they are
built up by a combination of genetics and experiences.
In the sense of personality, I agree.
In the sense of actually being conscious, I believe there's an all
or nothing threshold. I believe this due to personal introspection
(I believe I remember my first moment of consciousness). This is
not a scientific claim, of course and I will not try to defend it.
You'll have to do your own introspection and I can't complain if
you arrive at different conclusions.
I disagree. I think there is consciousness without introspection,
e.g. my dog is conscious in this way and maybe even Bruno's jumping
spider. And introspection is not all-or-nothing. As John Clark has
noted, you can introspectively observed that you are introspectively
observing...but beyond that you quickly run out of introspection.
And the reason is easy to see, we cannot introspectively observe the
firing of neurons or the diffusion across synapses.
I don't really have a problem with this. I don't think that
introspection and consciousness are the same thing.
I agree. Consciousness is not propositional. It is the truth that you
know that there is at least one truth or one reality. You might not
know what it is, or what is its nature, but you know, even for sure,
that there is something. Worms know this, I guess.
That happens already at the robinsonian degree.
Introspection happen at the löbian degree, where the machine has more
self-awareness, both its believability predicate and its knowability
operator verifies []p -> [][]p. This leads to "self-consciousness",
which can lead to more delusion, actually.
That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I
find this theory contrary to experience.
It cannot possibly be contrary to experience. Experience implies
you-ness.
??? It doesn't imply sameness.
I'm not saying it does. What I am saying is that the very concept
of experience is what creates the feeling of "you". The claim that
we are all the same person but appear different due to experience
is consistent with the experience of you being your own person
separate from me.
Yes, it's consistent with us all being the same person when "same"
is redefined to mean "different".
I would say that our potential disagreement on definitions is on
"person".
For the reasoning, one need only the notion of first person defined in
term of memory content taken by the experiencer in the tele-box.
For the math part, we can concentrate on machine which believes in RA
and PA, and are ideally correct (like PA is, imho).
Once you accept the digital brain, a person can understand that he/she
is not her body, as she can change her body everything hour if she
wants.
The person is an abstract immaterial, and plausibly high level
arithmetical being, (with comp), but this leads to the (interesting, I
think) problem of recovering the physical laws by the FPI on the
sigma_1 sentences.
I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly did
not seem to be the same person as when they could remember things.
Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person
as present day Brent to an external observer? Yet you can probably
remember being 5 year old Brent.
Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of
memories. And in which I am not Telmo or Bruno.
That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The
trouble is that, if we assume we are all the same person going
through MWI/FPI style duplications, we get a reality that is also
exactly consistent with empirical experience, including Alzheimers
and childhood memories.
Exactly. By redefining "same" we create an untestable theory, but
one that is useful to Depak Chopra.
Do you know of a testable theory that addresses the hard problem?
Classical computationalism. The solution is that G* proves []p <-> []p
& p, but the machine cannot believe it, still less know it.
For the qualia, and perhaps the quanta, you need the weaker versions:
[]p <-> []p & <>p & p, or [] & <>p <-> []p & <>p & p.
Bruno
However it is not very useful to serious people trying to cure
Alzheimers.
Not is a David Lynch movie useful to reduce obesity. What's your
point exactly?
Telmo.
Brent
I am not claiming emergentism is wrong, I am just claiming you have
no reason to prefer emergentism over "we are all the same person".
I do apologize if my thoughts are a bit disorganized.
Telmo.
Brent
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