On 04 Aug 2014, at 15:15, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 6:37 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 8/3/2014 5:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 7:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person after-
experiences.
Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie.
> In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry',
Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow
and one will not, nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things
were symmetrical there would only be one person regardless of how
many bodies there were; there needs to be a break in symmetry for
the concepts of "you" and "me" to be meaningful. You and I are two
different people because things are
unsymmetrical, we both have memories that the other does not; In
the thought experiment things are a little more complicated
because the Helsinki Man has no memories that the Moscow Man (or
Washington Man) does not, but the Moscow Man DOES have memories
the Helsinki Man does not, such as the memory of seeing Moscow.
Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that
a person can exist independently of any memories.
Perhaps ironically, ISTM this is trivially true if you accept the
conventional neuroscience hypothesis that consciousness emerges
from brain activity. Then, there is some moment after birth when a
baby becomes conscious. At that moment they form their first memory
and exist as a conscious entity without any previous memories.
How do you know they don't first form a memory and then become
conscious?
What does "they" mean before consciousness? The lump of molecules?
If we allow for this broader definition of memory, then any form of
stigmergy counts as memories and this discussion becoms a bit moot...
Or more likely the person, in the sense of personality, doesn't not
just come into being like switching on a light; rather they are
built up by a combination of genetics and experiences.
In the sense of personality, I agree.
In the sense of actually being conscious, I believe there's an all
or nothing threshold.
I think so. Despite the variety of conscious state, all are clearly
not "unconscious state".
I believe this due to personal introspection (I believe I remember
my first moment of consciousness). This is not a scientific claim,
of course and I will not try to defend it. You'll have to do your
own introspection and I can't complain if you arrive at different
conclusions.
That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I
find this theory contrary to experience.
It cannot possibly be contrary to experience. Experience implies
you-ness.
??? It doesn't imply sameness.
I'm not saying it does. What I am saying is that the very concept of
experience is what creates the feeling of "you". The claim that we
are all the same person but appear different due to experience is
consistent with the experience of you being your own person separate
from me.
Yes. Like the W and M persons can believe they are both the same H
person, even if separated and differentiating.
A bit like in Dirac theory where there is only one electron, just
travelling space-time so as to act in many places in an apparent
simultaneity relatively to us.
You do have that situation with time-travel. If you go back in time
and meet you as a kid, you are both persons in play, yet separated
from their relative and respective points of view.
I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly did
not seem to be the same person as when they could remember things.
Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person
as present day Brent to an external observer? Yet you can probably
remember being 5 year old Brent.
Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of
memories. And in which I am not Telmo or Bruno.
That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The trouble
is that, if we assume we are all the same person going through MWI/
FPI style duplications, we get a reality that is also exactly
consistent with empirical experience, including Alzheimers and
childhood memories. I am not claiming emergentism is wrong, I am
just claiming you have no reason to prefer emergentism over "we are
all the same person".
With computationalism, that might even be a question or personal
choice. At some point/level, we might be what we want to be, somehow.
We can let it go, but there is no obligation, (unless when being in a
very difficult situation, like being tortured, or in some catastrophes).
Bruno
I do apologize if my thoughts are a bit disorganized.
Telmo.
Brent
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