On 04 Aug 2014, at 22:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/4/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2014, at 20:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person after-
experiences.
Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie.
> In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry',
Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow
and one will not, nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things
were symmetrical there would only be one person regardless of how
many bodies there were; there needs to be a break in symmetry for
the concepts of "you" and "me" to be meaningful. You and I are
two different people because things are unsymmetrical, we both
have memories that the other does not; In the thought experiment
things are a little more complicated because the Helsinki Man has
no memories that the Moscow Man (or Washington Man) does not, but
the Moscow Man DOES have memories the Helsinki Man does not, such
as the memory of seeing Moscow.
Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that
a person can exist independently of any memories.
Well, on this list I have regularly claim that the number of
(first) person is an open problem.
Then, it is true that salvia suggests the possibility that there is
only one.
But computationalism suggest this too. We would all be the unique
abstract person described by the logic S4Grz, with the '[]' taken
as minimal as possible.
What happens with salvia is that you can not only become amnesic
(or better dissociated from your memory but still able to access
them, but not having them as personal memories) but you get the
feeling of remembering something that you have always known and
which is quite specific. You can't really come back with that
memory. There is a double amnesia in play: there is an amnesia (of
your mundane local self) when going in there, and there is an
amnesia of some aspect of there when coming back.
That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I
find this theory contrary to experience. I've had two relatives
die of Alzheimers and they certainly did not seem to be the same
person as when they could remember things.
Well; look at some people under salvia, and they don't seem the
same person as when they are sober. Well, that is typically true
also for alcohol and most string psychotropic. But in this case,
you define by the person in part by its memories. the whole point
here, is that we might be the same person, even with quite
different memories. Imagine the W-guy meeting and falling in love
with a muslim girl/man and deciding to become muslim, and imagine
the M-guy meeting and falling in love with a jewish girl/man and
deciding to become israelite, and imagine them both living a full
life, and being old. They would still both be the H-guy. They are
the same person, just living different lives.
If you agree with this, it is just normal to consider that we might
be the same person,
I think this is just playing around with the ambiguity of "same".
Do I live in the same house I bought thirty years ago. Yes, I have
the deed. No, I've added two rooms, changed all the floors.
Comp gives the 3p identity criterium, from the level of susbstitution
you bet on.
Then the 1p recognizance criteria is very simple. All the copies are
declared the same person as the one copied, except that now they
differentiate.
And that can help to understand that we are all already the same
person, having multiplied and differentiate.
Then computer science shows that there is indeed a universal notion of
first person, given by the knowability (non arithmetic) operator,
provided by the definition of knowledge by Theaetetus.
Bruno
Brent
living different lives. When using salvia, that intuition can be
lived from inside, and it makes people usually more empathic, and
more shocked by what humans do to other humans, without realizing
that at some level, all the bad they do is to themselves, and that
they are just blind about who they really are.
I tend to think now that we are indeed the same person, but note
that this is not relevant for UDA, AUDA and the reversal, which let
open the questions about "ultimate" personal identity.
Bruno
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