On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 3:02 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 3:58 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> What does level of substitution have to do with it. You've defined the >> correct level substitution as one below which consciousness is unchanged. >> So the the definition already requires that we know what it means for a >> consciousness to be the same, i.e. unchanged. >> >> >> >> Then the 1p recognizance criteria is very simple. All the copies are >> declared the same person as the one copied, except that now they >> differentiate. >> >> And that can help to understand that we are all already the same >> person, having multiplied and differentiate. >> >> >> I guess it would if I were a copy of somebody. >> >> >> >> >> Then computer science shows that there is indeed a universal notion of >> first person, given by the knowability (non arithmetic) operator, provided >> by the definition of knowledge by Theaetetus. >> >> >> Having a notion of person doesn't imply that all persons are the same >> person. >> > > I don't see why all the convolution in this thread around ambiguity of > notion of person is required. It just makes unnecessarily complex what > seems ambiguous at the start. > > Assume some emergence phenomenon and you risk reductionism at fundamental > problem of identity, and the usual fascisms of discrimination can follow. > Assume some universal person and you aren't a step further dealing with > problems of evil and difference. > > What "universal person" has that "emergence" doesn't is a reason to foster > empathy in fundamental/primitive sense, underneath some utility derivative > from evolution, as is the case with some emergence interpretations. But > does this even matter? > > The Bee Gees made approximation of stating this ambiguity and sold > millions of records with the kitschy: > > How deep is your love > I really need to learn > 'Cause we're living in a world of fools > Breaking us down > When they all should let us be > We belong to you and me > > And because it's a kitschy song, no need to take literally or feel smart > :-) > > Like Telmo said, if I recall correctly, it's super easy to fall into > taking sides on these issues without knowing it... > I would rather phrase it as "...without being aware of the assumptions". Not being aware of assumptions is perhaps the agnostic's version of sinning :) Telmo. > which I guess I do too. Thus don't really have anything solid to say about > these things + wonder if it matters at all. No smart-ass "hehe, those guys > are definitely idiots compared to my privileged position of experience and > knowledge, stupid dreamers/factualists/realists/emergence materialists > etc." from here... which just covers up the ambiguity for some security > ruse in the mirror the speaker holds up to themselves in some funk. PGC > > >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

