On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 3:02 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy <
[email protected]> wrote:

>
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 3:58 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>> What does level of substitution have to do with it.  You've defined the
>> correct level substitution as one below which consciousness is unchanged.
>> So the the definition already requires that we know what it means for a
>> consciousness to be the same, i.e. unchanged.
>>
>>
>>
>>  Then the 1p recognizance criteria is very simple. All the copies are
>> declared the same person as the one copied, except that now they
>> differentiate.
>>
>>  And that can help to understand that we are all already the same
>> person, having multiplied and differentiate.
>>
>>
>> I guess it would if I were a copy of somebody.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  Then computer science shows that there is indeed a universal notion of
>> first person, given by the knowability (non arithmetic) operator, provided
>> by the definition of knowledge by Theaetetus.
>>
>>
>> Having a notion of person doesn't imply that all persons are the same
>> person.
>>
>
> I don't see why all the convolution in this thread around ambiguity of
> notion of person is required. It just makes unnecessarily complex what
> seems ambiguous at the start.
>
> Assume some emergence phenomenon and you risk reductionism at fundamental
> problem of identity, and the usual fascisms of discrimination can follow.
> Assume some universal person and you aren't a step further dealing with
> problems of evil and difference.
>
> What "universal person" has that "emergence" doesn't is a reason to foster
> empathy in fundamental/primitive sense, underneath some utility derivative
> from evolution, as is the case with some emergence interpretations. But
> does this even matter?
>
> The Bee Gees made approximation of stating this ambiguity and sold
> millions of records with the kitschy:
>
> How deep is your love
> I really need to learn
> 'Cause we're living in a world of fools
> Breaking us down
> When they all should let us be
> We belong to you and me
>
> And because it's a kitschy song, no need to take literally or feel smart
> :-)
>
> Like Telmo said, if I recall correctly, it's super easy to fall into
> taking sides on these issues without knowing it...
>

I would rather phrase it as "...without being aware of the assumptions".
Not being aware of assumptions is perhaps the agnostic's version of sinning
:)

Telmo.


> which I guess I do too. Thus don't really have anything solid to say about
> these things + wonder if it matters at all. No smart-ass "hehe, those guys
> are definitely idiots compared to my privileged position of experience and
> knowledge, stupid dreamers/factualists/realists/emergence materialists
> etc." from here... which just covers up the ambiguity for some security
> ruse in the mirror the speaker holds up to themselves in some funk. PGC
>
>
>>
>> Brent
>>
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