On 06 Aug 2014, at 03:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/5/2014 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Aug 2014, at 22:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/4/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2014, at 20:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal
<[email protected]> wrote:
> Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person after-
experiences.
Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie.
> In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry',
Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow
and one will not, nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things
were symmetrical there would only be one person regardless of
how many bodies there were; there needs to be a break in
symmetry for the concepts of "you" and "me" to be meaningful.
You and I are two different people because things are
unsymmetrical, we both have memories that the other does not;
In the thought experiment things are a little more complicated
because the Helsinki Man has no memories that the Moscow Man
(or Washington Man) does not, but the Moscow Man DOES have
memories the Helsinki Man does not, such as the memory of
seeing Moscow.
Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience,
that a person can exist independently of any memories.
Well, on this list I have regularly claim that the number of
(first) person is an open problem.
Then, it is true that salvia suggests the possibility that there
is only one.
But computationalism suggest this too. We would all be the unique
abstract person described by the logic S4Grz, with the '[]' taken
as minimal as possible.
What happens with salvia is that you can not only become amnesic
(or better dissociated from your memory but still able to access
them, but not having them as personal memories) but you get the
feeling of remembering something that you have always known and
which is quite specific. You can't really come back with that
memory. There is a double amnesia in play: there is an amnesia
(of your mundane local self) when going in there, and there is an
amnesia of some aspect of there when coming back.
That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I
find this theory contrary to experience. I've had two relatives
die of Alzheimers and they certainly did not seem to be the same
person as when they could remember things.
Well; look at some people under salvia, and they don't seem the
same person as when they are sober. Well, that is typically true
also for alcohol and most string psychotropic. But in this case,
you define by the person in part by its memories. the whole point
here, is that we might be the same person, even with quite
different memories. Imagine the W-guy meeting and falling in love
with a muslim girl/man and deciding to become muslim, and imagine
the M-guy meeting and falling in love with a jewish girl/man and
deciding to become israelite, and imagine them both living a full
life, and being old. They would still both be the H-guy. They are
the same person, just living different lives.
If you agree with this, it is just normal to consider that we
might be the same person,
I think this is just playing around with the ambiguity of "same".
Do I live in the same house I bought thirty years ago. Yes, I
have the deed. No, I've added two rooms, changed all the floors.
Comp gives the 3p identity criterium, from the level of
susbstitution you bet on.
What does level of substitution have to do with it. You've defined
the correct level substitution as one below which consciousness is
unchanged. So the the definition already requires that we know what
it means for a consciousness to be the same, i.e. unchanged.
We don't need that definition. We don't need it no more than we need a
definition of "staying alive" when accepting an heart operation, or
accepting taking a plane, or sleeping a night. We need to bet on a
level, but no more than that.
Then the 1p recognizance criteria is very simple. All the copies
are declared the same person as the one copied, except that now
they differentiate.
And that can help to understand that we are all already the same
person, having multiplied and differentiate.
I guess it would if I were a copy of somebody.
You are plausibly already a sort of half copy of your father + half
copy of your mother, with some variance. Plausibly nature bet on comp
too, as with the genetic code, which is a universal number relatively
to the turing universal carbon chemistry (in some condition of
pressure, temperature and humidity).
Then computer science shows that there is indeed a universal notion
of first person, given by the knowability (non arithmetic)
operator, provided by the definition of knowledge by Theaetetus.
Having a notion of person doesn't imply that all persons are the
same person.
Correct. And the number of persons, nor the notion of personal
identity is relevant to understand the reversal.
But to understand the translation in arithmetic, we need to define the
3p self. This is done with the usual second theorem of Kleene, which I
explained the basic by the formal diagonal applied to itself (D"X" =
"X"X"", and variants). This leads mathematically to the logic G and G*
(by Gödel, Löb, Solovay).
Then incompleteness makes Theaetetus' definition of
"knowability" (say) working. With "'[]p" obeying to G, the new
operator "[-]p, defined by []p & p (in the arithmetical intepretation
of "[]", that is Gödel's beweisbar predicate, and p some arithmetical
sentences (for matter, we restrict them on the sigma_1 sentences).
And we get the miracle needed, which saves both the modern (who likes
[]p & p), and the ancients mystic/rationalist/platonist who like the
idea, or respect the introspective data, that the knowing is non
propositional, and the knower being not a machine, and being not
definable.
Gerson thinks that by defining knowledge by true belief, we make
knowledge as a sort of particular belief, and that it makes knowledge
representational. With comp, that is partially true, in some sense,
but only in G*. It makes no sense from its first person point of view,
and correctly so. Gerson confuse the informal "[]p" and p, with the
formal "[]p & p", which for "Tarski-Gödel-Epimenides" reason, get no
more definable in the language of the universal machine concerned.
Like Judson Webb shows that incompleteness protects Church's Thesis,
incompleteness protects the soul from any possible 3p definition. With
comp, you can luckily bet on a correct sublevel (too much grained) but
in no way you can prove that you get the precise correct description
of yourself capable of supporting your soul. If you could, you would
be able to prove that []p -> []p & p, and, although G* can do that, G
you can't, and you can't.
Is the S4Grz person a universal person. Assuredly.
Is it *the* universal person?
That is not needed neither for auda, nor of course for uda, but
although I doubt this could make sense, I am not that sure. Thanks to
salvia, I have one more doubt.
Bruno
Brent
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