On 8/8/2014 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Aug 2014, at 21:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/7/2014 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp gives the 3p identity criterium, from the level of susbstitution you bet
on.
What does level of substitution have to do with it. You've defined the correct level
substitution as one below which consciousness is unchanged. So the the definition
already requires that we know what it means for a consciousness to be the same, i.e.
unchanged.
We don't need that definition.
I didn't say we needed a definition. I said we needed to know what it means for one's
consciousness to be the same.
I thought the question was if the person remains the same.
No when considering whether to say yes to the doctor. You've switched to the duplication
example.
With comp, the teleportation suppose that the level chosen is such that all memories are
preserved, and we define the identity of the person by its memories. It is "legal" third
person definition of identity, which might be signed by Obama and the governor. We agree
that John Clark from helsinki, is still alive after the duplication, and he lived now in
Washington, and in Moscow. For example. You keep your identity in all duplication: it is
your consciousness which differentiate. The first person experience, on the contrary,
feels to be unique and like being selected randomly (for the vast majority). But if they
have bet on comp, and understand comp, they know that is has to be like that. In that
case, all the copies are all the same persons. The HWWMMMMMW-John Clark has the legal
right to claim being John Clark, but when playing chess with his fellow MMWWMMWMWW-John
Clark, he knows that he is not that other guy for now, because, despite they share a
initial life memory, that life has differentiated in different histories since that
(reiterated) self-multiplication.
Then, if you agree that we can consider all the John Clark reconstitutions, as genuine
same person (Our friend John Clark), despite their multiple variate first person views,
you can understand that we might understand that in fact we are all the same initial
amoeba,
Or we can see that we don't have the same memories and therefore, like the John Clarks
playing chess, are not same person.
Brent
and even the same initial universal system, which seems to need that 'blanche
consciousness/conscience state", which would be the initial differentiating consciousness.
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