On 06 Aug 2014, at 16:02, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:




On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 3:58 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

What does level of substitution have to do with it. You've defined the correct level substitution as one below which consciousness is unchanged. So the the definition already requires that we know what it means for a consciousness to be the same, i.e. unchanged.



Then the 1p recognizance criteria is very simple. All the copies are declared the same person as the one copied, except that now they differentiate.

And that can help to understand that we are all already the same person, having multiplied and differentiate.

I guess it would if I were a copy of somebody.




Then computer science shows that there is indeed a universal notion of first person, given by the knowability (non arithmetic) operator, provided by the definition of knowledge by Theaetetus.

Having a notion of person doesn't imply that all persons are the same person.

I don't see why all the convolution in this thread around ambiguity of notion of person is required. It just makes unnecessarily complex what seems ambiguous at the start.

Assume some emergence phenomenon and you risk reductionism at fundamental problem of identity, and the usual fascisms of discrimination can follow. Assume some universal person and you aren't a step further dealing with problems of evil and difference.

What "universal person" has that "emergence" doesn't is a reason to foster empathy in fundamental/primitive sense, underneath some utility derivative from evolution, as is the case with some emergence interpretations. But does this even matter?

The Bee Gees made approximation of stating this ambiguity and sold millions of records with the kitschy:

How deep is your love
I really need to learn
'Cause we're living in a world of fools
Breaking us down
When they all should let us be
We belong to you and me

And because it's a kitschy song, no need to take literally or feel smart :-)

Like Telmo said, if I recall correctly, it's super easy to fall into taking sides on these issues without knowing it... which I guess I do too. Thus don't really have anything solid to say about these things + wonder if it matters at all.

It does not matter to get grasp the reversal (uda).

Then the S4Grz logic is the logic of a universal person, that plays a role in (auda). But it does not matter if S4grz is *the* universal person, although it match well Plotinus "Inner God", the soul of the world, or the universal soul.



No smart-ass "hehe, those guys are definitely idiots compared to my privileged position of experience and knowledge, stupid dreamers/ factualists/realists/emergence materialists etc." from here... which just covers up the ambiguity for some security ruse in the mirror the speaker holds up to themselves in some funk. PGC

Lol

Bruno







Brent

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