On 08 Aug 2014, at 23:12, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/8/2014 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Aug 2014, at 21:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/7/2014 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp gives the 3p identity criterium, from the level of
susbstitution you bet on.
What does level of substitution have to do with it. You've
defined the correct level substitution as one below which
consciousness is unchanged. So the the definition already
requires that we know what it means for a consciousness to be
the same, i.e. unchanged.
We don't need that definition.
I didn't say we needed a definition. I said we needed to know what
it means for one's consciousness to be the same.
I thought the question was if the person remains the same.
No when considering whether to say yes to the doctor. You've
switched to the duplication example.
? You lost me completely here.
With comp, the teleportation suppose that the level chosen is such
that all memories are preserved, and we define the identity of the
person by its memories. It is "legal" third person definition of
identity, which might be signed by Obama and the governor. We agree
that John Clark from helsinki, is still alive after the
duplication, and he lived now in Washington, and in Moscow. For
example. You keep your identity in all duplication: it is your
consciousness which differentiate. The first person experience, on
the contrary, feels to be unique and like being selected randomly
(for the vast majority). But if they have bet on comp, and
understand comp, they know that is has to be like that. In that
case, all the copies are all the same persons. The HWWMMMMMW-John
Clark has the legal right to claim being John Clark, but when
playing chess with his fellow MMWWMMWMWW-John Clark, he knows that
he is not that other guy for now, because, despite they share a
initial life memory, that life has differentiated in different
histories since that (reiterated) self-multiplication.
Then, if you agree that we can consider all the John Clark
reconstitutions, as genuine same person (Our friend John Clark),
despite their multiple variate first person views, you can
understand that we might understand that in fact we are all the
same initial amoeba,
Or we can see that we don't have the same memories and therefore,
like the John Clarks playing chess, are not same person.
We have already decided to not use that notion of identity, because it
is not relevant for the "physical retrieving problem" that we get with
comp.
Strictly speaking with this identity criterion P(<any-first -person-
event>) = 0, as our memories changes all the time.
I identify "Brent" as the same guy as the one I talked with last year,
and even much before, on this list. It eases the talk, as we can say
that in the duplication H-WM, both the M-person and the W-person are
the H-person, which makes sense: they certainly deserve the same right.
Of course, they live different experiences (on which the proba were
about), and differentiate, but they both remain "the H-person", even
differing more and more. We are in a modal context where Leibniz
identity rule does not apply.
You don't need any of this to solve the little FPI exercise that I
gave, for example. Just that the problem of the number of person is
interesting by itself. Comp is plausibly consistent with any number
bigger than 0, but the number 1 helps to make sense of Plotinus and
salvia.
Bruno
Brent
and even the same initial universal system, which seems to need
that 'blanche consciousness/conscience state", which would be the
initial differentiating consciousness.
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