On 8/18/2014 4:23 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 18 August 2014 23:27, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
I'm not entirely clear on Bruno's argument on this last point. The way
I see it, if a brain is simulated by a computer program, what is being
simulated is the physics; and if comp is true, that means that
simulating the physics will also reproduce the brain's consciousness.
I'm not sure about computations instantiating consciousness without
instantiating physics, and I'm not sure how instantiating the
appearance of physics is different to instantiating (virtual) physics.
I've always understood him to be saying, in the first place, that the dovetailer
necessarily generates certain classes of self-referential computations. Very generally,
such computations are then regarded as emulating self-referred (i.e. first-personal or
indexical) logics that in turn are amenable to treatment as "beliefs" in realities or
appearances. So the idea is that comp necessarily entails epistemological logics (the
"dreams of the machines")
Except that it seems to be an epistemology very different from ones we usually practice.
What's the last time you learned a fact about the world by proving it from Peano's axioms?
that are *prior* to physics in the sense that only certain sub-classes will be
characterised by the statistical dominance of physically-lawlike relations over their
range of reference.
It's pretty much like Bertrand Russell's neutral monism. There are events or states that
classified one way constitute experiences or thoughts of individuals, and classified
another way, some of them constitute objective physical events.
Brent
I've always assumed that it's this logical priority of "machine psychology" over the
subsequent appearance of lawlike physical relations that constitutes the postulated
"reversal".
David
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
