On 19 Aug 2014, at 02:53, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/18/2014 4:23 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 18 August 2014 23:27, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
I'm not entirely clear on Bruno's argument on this last point. The
way
I see it, if a brain is simulated by a computer program, what is
being
simulated is the physics; and if comp is true, that means that
simulating the physics will also reproduce the brain's consciousness.
I'm not sure about computations instantiating consciousness without
instantiating physics, and I'm not sure how instantiating the
appearance of physics is different to instantiating (virtual)
physics.
I've always understood him to be saying, in the first place, that
the dovetailer necessarily generates certain classes of self-
referential computations. Very generally, such computations are
then regarded as emulating self-referred (i.e. first-personal or
indexical) logics that in turn are amenable to treatment as
"beliefs" in realities or appearances. So the idea is that comp
necessarily entails epistemological logics (the "dreams of the
machines")
Except that it seems to be an epistemology very different from ones
we usually practice. What's the last time you learned a fact about
the world by proving it from Peano's axioms?
The whole of math, analysis and the industrial reality is based on the
Peano axioms, and even stronger theory like the original theory of
Dedekind, with full second-order induction axiom (analysis).
If PA or RA could nor justify why you can read this mail, when doing
some click here and there on your screen, you wouldn't be reading this
mail.
Then Peano is not the epistemology, it is S4, and it is a metatheory
about your knwoledgeability. You don't need it, like you dion't need
to understand how your bain makes you understand that 2+2=4, to
understand that 2+2=4. In our context, PA is just the Escherichia Coli
of the löbian justifier, knower, observer, feeler.
Bruno
that are *prior* to physics in the sense that only certain sub-
classes will be characterised by the statistical dominance of
physically-lawlike relations over their range of reference.
It's pretty much like Bertrand Russell's neutral monism. There are
events or states that classified one way constitute experiences or
thoughts of individuals, and classified another way, some of them
constitute objective physical events.
Brent
I've always assumed that it's this logical priority of "machine
psychology" over the subsequent appearance of lawlike physical
relations that constitutes the postulated "reversal".
David
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