On 9/19/2014 9:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Sep 2014, at 03:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/18/2014 5:46 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
Consciousness has a state (which we call the
observer moment). If that state differs, then the state of the
supervened must also differ.
Thus consciousness cannot supervene on the UD* as it doesn't change
for a change of state of consciousness.
This seems to me to arise from equivocation about "consciousness". You are treating
it, as I experience it, as a temporal phenomenon - a succession of thoughts, an inner
narrative. That's the consciousness I'd like to be able to
program/engineer/understand. But Bruno make's consciousness a potentiality of an
axiomatic system, for which he seems almost everything alive as a model (in the
mathematical sense), anything that could instantiate an "if-then" or a
"controlled-controlled-not". And he says that salvia makes him think consciousness
need not be temporal - which might be like whiskey sometimes makes me think the ground
sways. From Bruno's viewpoint the UD* just IS and Alice's different thoughts as
different times are just computations of those thoughts which are correlated with
computations of those times. That may resolve the atemporal UD vs the temporal
experience, but it still doesn't explain consciousness. It doesn't explain what
computations of Alice's are constitute her consciousness as opposed to her
subconsciousness or her brain functions or other stuff going on. It is not an answer
to say, well maybe everything in conscious.
When you say "Bruno make's consciousness a potentiality of an axiomatic system", it
would be more correct to say, that I attribute an actual conscious state, very raw, to
the machine having that universal potentiallity.
But you've said you don't believe in "observer moments", so I don't know what "an actual
conscious state" can refer to. If it refers to a "universal potentiality" I'd say you're
just muddling words. A potentiality and a actual state are contradictory things.
To attribute consciousness to non universal object, will not make much sense, as object
somehow exists only in the imaginations of universal machines. That raw basic
consciousness is shared by my and yours laptop, it is the same consciousness, and it can
differentiate maximally on all computational histories.
All that means is you've completely redefined "conscious" in you own special language so
that it has nothing to do with with direct experience, or any experience at all. Yet in
other context you insist it is what is directly experience and it is the only knowledge
(as compared to mere belief).
But that is not an explanation of consciousness, just a consequence of the mechanist
hypothesis,
It's a consequence of an unique definition of "consciousness".
which is used more to formulate the problem than to answer it, except that comp makes it
possible to formulate the problem in arithmetic, and to use meta-arithmetical theorems
to get some light (the arithmetical points of view/hypostases) on the picture. Shortly
UDA is the problem, AUDA (G, G*, S4Grz, ...) is the beginning of the solution and its
testing, improvement, etc.
I don't thing it makes sense to say that everything is conscious, only the subject, that
is the (universal) machines and the gods.
When are they conscious? Is my laptop conscious when it's turned off (it still has the
potential of being turned on)? Is it conscious no matter what program it's executing?
technically I could explain that there is a notion of sub-universality, or
sub-creativity, and that conciousness starts probably there, but that would be too much
technical. Consciousness starts with the self-speeding up ability.
How can "speeding up" mean anything about an atemporal potentiality?
Brent
A sub-universal universal number is a self-accelerator, and that's how it get more and
more independence and freedom, in principle, and only when asteroids leave them alone
(bad luck), and when they don't destroy themselves (bad faith).
Bruno
Brent
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