On 9/21/2014 10:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Sep 2014, at 02:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/19/2014 9:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Sep 2014, at 03:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/18/2014 5:46 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
Consciousness has a state (which we call the
observer moment). If that state differs, then the state of the
supervened must also differ.
Thus consciousness cannot supervene on the UD* as it doesn't change
for a change of state of consciousness.
This seems to me to arise from equivocation about "consciousness". You are treating
it, as I experience it, as a temporal phenomenon - a succession of thoughts, an inner
narrative. That's the consciousness I'd like to be able to
program/engineer/understand. But Bruno make's consciousness a potentiality of an
axiomatic system, for which he seems almost everything alive as a model (in the
mathematical sense), anything that could instantiate an "if-then" or a
"controlled-controlled-not". And he says that salvia makes him think consciousness
need not be temporal - which might be like whiskey sometimes makes me think the
ground sways. From Bruno's viewpoint the UD* just IS and Alice's different thoughts
as different times are just computations of those thoughts which are correlated with
computations of those times. That may resolve the atemporal UD vs the temporal
experience, but it still doesn't explain consciousness. It doesn't explain what
computations of Alice's are constitute her consciousness as opposed to her
subconsciousness or her brain functions or other stuff going on. It is not an answer
to say, well maybe everything in conscious.
When you say "Bruno make's consciousness a potentiality of an axiomatic system", it
would be more correct to say, that I attribute an actual conscious state, very raw, to
the machine having that universal potentiallity.
But you've said you don't believe in "observer moments", so I don't know what "an
actual conscious state" can refer to.
Oh, I just mean a raw particular conscious state, like the state of Alice in the room,
or the state of someone in some particular circonstances. Mathematically this has to be
defined in arithmetic, and some instinctive belief in <>p can work, in a first 3-1p
approximation. (<>p v p) works better in the 1p-1p approximation. It is an act of faith,
where we are not conscious of the 'faith" act, and quickly based, as we repeat that act
every second since birth, perhaps before.
If it refers to a "universal potentiality" I'd say you're just muddling words. A
potentiality and a actual state are contradictory things.
No problem. I "really" (currently) tend to think that RA has a raw (even statical) form
of consciousness, close to the consciousness of all babies, animal and perhaps plants.
In other words, something completely different from our inner experience of which we have
first-person knowledge.
To attribute consciousness to non universal object, will not make much sense, as
object somehow exists only in the imaginations of universal machines. That raw basic
consciousness is shared by my and yours laptop, it is the same consciousness, and it
can differentiate maximally on all computational histories.
All that means is you've completely redefined "conscious" in you own special language
so that it has nothing to do with with direct experience, or any experience at all.
Not at all. It is a "natural" state of consciousness, but that we are not aware
of,
"Consciousness is something we are not aware of."? That borders on double-talk.
because we focus so much on the everyday content. There are technic, like stopping
thinking, medicating, or with some plants, to access more easily such state.
You can also conceive it, with enough imagination, by doing thought experience involving
amnesia. Forgetting memories does not diminish consciousness (sometimes it can even been
felt as liberating, especially when forgetting trauma, or annoying contexts, etc).
Nobody has suggested that forgetting diminishes consciousness. What I, and others, have
said is that if you forgot *all* your memories then whether the same consciousness
continued would be doubtful.
Then you might be able to conceive that complete amnesia without change in the
"intensity" of consciousness can make sense.
Yet in other context you insist it is what is directly experience and it is the only
knowledge (as compared to mere belief).
Yes. Indeed, it is what is common in all experiences. It is not empty, even if we
usually rarely focus on that state.
But that is not an explanation of consciousness, just a consequence of the mechanist
hypothesis,
It's a consequence of an unique definition of "consciousness".
which is used more to formulate the problem than to answer it, except that comp makes
it possible to formulate the problem in arithmetic,
But why should we suppose the problem formulated in arithmetic is the same problem that we
wanted answered: What makes some arrangements of matter conscious and not others? I
suspect that the "reformulated problem in arithmetic" is completely different.
and to use meta-arithmetical theorems to get some light (the arithmetical points of
view/hypostases) on the picture. Shortly UDA is the problem, AUDA (G, G*, S4Grz, ...)
is the beginning of the solution and its testing, improvement, etc.
I don't thing it makes sense to say that everything is conscious, only the subject,
that is the (universal) machines and the gods.
When are they conscious?
Consciousness is not located in time and space. Those are part of the conscious
experience. The consciousness of your laptop is not "here and now" in your sense of
"here and now", but in the subject itself sense.
Is my laptop conscious when it's turned off (it still has the potential of being turned
on)?
You continue to use the machine-mind identity.
?? You're the one who brought up my laptop: "That raw basic consciousness is shared by my
and yours laptop,..."
Consciousness is an attribute of the abstract or immaterial person, which is distributed
in infinitely many arithmetical relations. The one of RA differentiates quickly, from
the subject views, into any possible computational histories. Running a program does not
create any consciousness, it helps only to make some person manifestable relatively to you.
And not manifest to anyone else either - which is evidence it doesn't exist.
Is it conscious no matter what program it's executing?
Yes.
Even if it's just turning the furnace ON when the house is too cold. I think you
contradict yourself. If my laptop is conscious even when it's OFF then consciousness is a
potentiality of an arrangement of matter.
technically I could explain that there is a notion of sub-universality, or
sub-creativity, and that conciousness starts probably there, but that would be too
much technical. Consciousness starts with the self-speeding up ability.
How can "speeding up" mean anything about an atemporal potentiality?
The "speeding-up" is itself an atemporal property of all universal (and sub-universal)
machines. It means that they have a high probabilities to find themselves in environment
where they can moves themselves and develop "free-will" or "will".
?? I think you just mean that an intelligence that kept track of all its reasoning would
be slow.
Brent
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