On 22 Sep 2014, at 00:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/21/2014 10:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Sep 2014, at 02:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/19/2014 9:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Sep 2014, at 03:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/18/2014 5:46 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
Consciousness has a state (which we call the
observer moment). If that state differs, then the state of the
supervened must also differ.
Thus consciousness cannot supervene on the UD* as it doesn't
change
for a change of state of consciousness.
This seems to me to arise from equivocation about
"consciousness". You are treating it, as I experience it, as a
temporal phenomenon - a succession of thoughts, an inner
narrative. That's the consciousness I'd like to be able to
program/engineer/understand. But Bruno make's consciousness a
potentiality of an axiomatic system, for which he seems almost
everything alive as a model (in the mathematical sense),
anything that could instantiate an "if-then" or a "controlled-
controlled-not". And he says that salvia makes him think
consciousness need not be temporal - which might be like whiskey
sometimes makes me think the ground sways. From Bruno's
viewpoint the UD* just IS and Alice's different thoughts as
different times are just computations of those thoughts which
are correlated with computations of those times. That may
resolve the atemporal UD vs the temporal experience, but it
still doesn't explain consciousness. It doesn't explain what
computations of Alice's are constitute her consciousness as
opposed to her subconsciousness or her brain functions or other
stuff going on. It is not an answer to say, well maybe
everything in conscious.
When you say "Bruno make's consciousness a potentiality of an
axiomatic system", it would be more correct to say, that I
attribute an actual conscious state, very raw, to the machine
having that universal potentiallity.
But you've said you don't believe in "observer moments", so I
don't know what "an actual conscious state" can refer to.
Oh, I just mean a raw particular conscious state, like the state of
Alice in the room, or the state of someone in some particular
circonstances. Mathematically this has to be defined in arithmetic,
and some instinctive belief in <>p can work, in a first 3-1p
approximation. (<>p v p) works better in the 1p-1p approximation.
It is an act of faith, where we are not conscious of the 'faith"
act, and quickly based, as we repeat that act every second since
birth, perhaps before.
If it refers to a "universal potentiality" I'd say you're just
muddling words. A potentiality and a actual state are
contradictory things.
No problem. I "really" (currently) tend to think that RA has a raw
(even statical) form of consciousness, close to the consciousness
of all babies, animal and perhaps plants.
In other words, something completely different from our inner
experience of which we have first-person knowledge.
Not at all. It is the inner experience of which babies, simple animals
and perhaps plants have their first person knowledge. With salvia or
Telmo's isolation tank, it seems most person can remember it. I try to
convey it sometimes by a progressive amnesy enlarging itself in a
complete amnesy. You can get that state in an instant, sometimes, when
looking at shining water.
To attribute consciousness to non universal object, will not make
much sense, as object somehow exists only in the imaginations of
universal machines. That raw basic consciousness is shared by my
and yours laptop, it is the same consciousness, and it can
differentiate maximally on all computational histories.
All that means is you've completely redefined "conscious" in you
own special language so that it has nothing to do with with direct
experience, or any experience at all.
Not at all. It is a "natural" state of consciousness, but that we
are not aware of,
"Consciousness is something we are not aware of."? That borders on
double-talk.
I forgot to say what we are not aware of, in consciousness. We are not
aware it ask already for faith. Consciousness is an interrogative
state, like 'am I real?', but we are not aware of the interrogation
mark, because that question is done automatically by the brain since
birth, probably before.
This "double-talk" works along Helmholtz theory of perception seen as
an automated "theorization/induction".
because we focus so much on the everyday content. There are
technic, like stopping thinking, medicating, or with some plants,
to access more easily such state.
You can also conceive it, with enough imagination, by doing thought
experience involving amnesia. Forgetting memories does not diminish
consciousness (sometimes it can even been felt as liberating,
especially when forgetting trauma, or annoying contexts, etc).
Nobody has suggested that forgetting diminishes consciousness.
Nice to hear that.
What I, and others, have said is that if you forgot *all* your
memories then whether the same consciousness continued would be
doubtful.
Of course. That is why salvia frighten most people, as there is that
moment where you have no idea who you are, nor what you are, before
the remindering which does not always occur, and then, instead of
reminding your divine origin (say) you begin to remind vaguely you
were a sort of person in some worlds, but there are so many that you
persuade yourself that you can't come back, or worst, that you might
come back "wrongly".
The comp lesson, copherent with those experience, is that altough
consciousness is an absolute, personal consciousness and identity is
extremely relative.
Then you might be able to conceive that complete amnesia without
change in the "intensity" of consciousness can make sense.
Yet in other context you insist it is what is directly experience
and it is the only knowledge (as compared to mere belief).
Yes. Indeed, it is what is common in all experiences. It is not
empty, even if we usually rarely focus on that state.
But that is not an explanation of consciousness, just a
consequence of the mechanist hypothesis,
It's a consequence of an unique definition of "consciousness".
which is used more to formulate the problem than to answer it,
except that comp makes it possible to formulate the problem in
arithmetic,
But why should we suppose the problem formulated in arithmetic is
the same problem that we wanted answered:
That follows from the assumption we have made: computationalism.
Roughly speaking, the problem becomes a problem in computer science,
and what I illustrate is that computer science explains entirely why
machines observing itself get the knowledge that reality seems divided
into observable and non-observable, (and also justifiable and non
justifiable, knowable and non knowable, sensible and non sensible,
etc.), and how they develop discourses on those things, and why there
is one thing that they can't absolutely understand, communicate, etc.
What makes some arrangements of matter conscious and not others?
No arrangment of matter is conscious. But consciousness can use reason
and can manifest itself through the arithmetical relation where they
have "enough long histories and memories". Consciousness is always
there from the inside view of arithmetic, like all the universal
numbers or relation are there, like all the the prime numbers are
there, which what you can understand if you agree with logic and
elementary arithmetic.
I suspect that the "reformulated problem in arithmetic" is
completely different.
Why?
and to use meta-arithmetical theorems to get some light (the
arithmetical points of view/hypostases) on the picture. Shortly
UDA is the problem, AUDA (G, G*, S4Grz, ...) is the beginning of
the solution and its testing, improvement, etc.
I don't thing it makes sense to say that everything is conscious,
only the subject, that is the (universal) machines and the gods.
When are they conscious?
Consciousness is not located in time and space. Those are part of
the conscious experience. The consciousness of your laptop is not
"here and now" in your sense of "here and now", but in the subject
itself sense.
Is my laptop conscious when it's turned off (it still has the
potential of being turned on)?
You continue to use the machine-mind identity.
?? You're the one who brought up my laptop: "That raw basic
consciousness is shared by my and yours laptop,..."
I was talking about the universal person incarnated in your laptop.
When your laptop is off, it does not become unconscious, it just
becomes impossible for it to manifest itself relatively to you.
Consciousness is 1p, and immaterial, but can be attributed to the
abstract person associated to the machine. Of course, for AUDA, you
can also decide to attribute consciousness to the Löbian machine,
which is the machine + some reservoir of induction axioms.
It is only that by extending the raw consciousness of the Löbian
universal machine to simpler universal machine explains better some
report of "mystical" experience. The consciousness of RA is an
"alterated consciousness state" for PA, if you want.
To be sure I don't use this idea in my publications, but I don't see
how we can avoid it in the translation of Plotinus, nor how could
salvia make sense if that is wrong. Some go farer in attrubuting
consciousness to all things, but I think that this is too much, and
might not make sense in comp, if only because "things" is not well
defined.
Consciousness is an attribute of the abstract or immaterial person,
which is distributed in infinitely many arithmetical relations. The
one of RA differentiates quickly, from the subject views, into any
possible computational histories. Running a program does not create
any consciousness, it helps only to make some person manifestable
relatively to you.
And not manifest to anyone else either - which is evidence it
doesn't exist.
?
No, once you run the program, the person can manifest relatively to
anyone. Of course if it is Obama the program (the person associated to
the program) might get trouble with the police.
Is it conscious no matter what program it's executing?
Yes.
Even if it's just turning the furnace ON when the house is too
cold. I think you contradict yourself.
Sorry, I understood "no matter what universal program is running".
Turning of and thermostats are too much simple. Consciousness start
with universal machine.
If my laptop is conscious even when it's OFF then consciousness is a
potentiality of an arrangement of matter.
Matter is a possible means to implement universal machine. That is of
course in need to be explained when we assume comp. Why can we build
stable computer from the statistics on the all computations running
below our substitution problem. the answer seems to be: because the
laws of observability ([]p & <>t, ...) obeys quantum logic when p is
restricted to the UD-accessible true propositions (the sigma_1 true
sentences).
technically I could explain that there is a notion of sub-
universality, or sub-creativity, and that conciousness starts
probably there, but that would be too much technical.
Consciousness starts with the self-speeding up ability.
How can "speeding up" mean anything about an atemporal potentiality?
The "speeding-up" is itself an atemporal property of all universal
(and sub-universal) machines. It means that they have a high
probabilities to find themselves in environment where they can
moves themselves and develop "free-will" or "will".
?? I think you just mean that an intelligence that kept track of
all its reasoning would be slow.
I alluded to a theorem by Blum and Marquez which shows that self-
speeding-up ability characterizes and is characterized by sub-
universality.
Or Blum theorem that creative set, or universal machine are infinitely
speedable (no best compiler theorem).
or Gödel's theorem on the length of proofs. (Adding an undecidable
sentence as axiom to a theory makes infinitely propositions becoming
decidable, and shortened infinitely many proofs of already decidable
propositions.
I can prove it one day, if we come back on the phi_i and the w_i. The
proof of that theorem is short.
Bruno
Brent
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