On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 19 Oct 2014, at 21:14, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: > > Very well, and now we go to the primal. I am presuming, but who wrote the > programs for computationalism, > > > I guess you mean "who wrote the programs for the computations" > (Computationalism is just a religious belief, or a philosophical axiom). > > If you are ready to accept that 2+2 = 4 independently of us (the living > being), then we don't need to write the programs of the computations, or > the program of the UD (which generates and executes all computations), > because their existence is of the same type as the truth of 2+2=4. That is, > elementary arithmetic implements all computations already. > > > > > who thought the great thought, who made Plato's ideals? > > > > It is part of elementary arithmetic. You need only to believe in the > axioms of arithmetic, like: > Bruno, You seem to be basing Platonia on human belief, which I admit is consistent with First Person Indeterminacy. But I prefer your prior comment that elementary arithmetic is independent of us. And I do not see how elementary arithmetic produces logic. Sorry to keep asking the same old questions. You need not answer. Richard > > 0 ≠ s(x) > s(x) = s(y) -> x = y > x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) > x+0 = x > x+s(y) = s(x+y) > x*0=0 > x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > > We see cause and effect in nature on our planet. > > > Platonist don't believe that what they see is necessarily real. If it is > persistent enough, they will take that as an evidence that there is > something real, but not that what they see is the real thing. > > > What causes lightning and thunder, or droughts, or earthquakes, and so > forth, however, these are local events, or apparently local, in the sense > of this region of the universe. But laws, or programs are more subtle. Yet > more profound. We have no indication, as of today, that life is prevalent > in the universe. > > > It is not well know, but there are strong evidences that life is prevalent > in arithmetic. In fact, it is provable once you accept computationalism. > > > > Not many scientists see panspermia as the dominating force, and what is > life but a chain of programs governing chemical action? > > > That is how we see them, but life is in the immaterial relations leading > to the experiences. > > > > If a law or program is said to emerge, then what from, Planck Cells? > > > Just from elementary arithmetic, as you have learned in high school. There > is no other assumption beside computationalism. > > > > How do planck cells produce programs. Is there a look up table, or akashic > database to be read? How did this relational database evolve? > > > > "evolves" is how it seems to us, but time, space, energy comes from the > First Person Indeterminacy on all computations seen from the first person > points of view (if computationalism is correct). That is computable, so it > makes computationalism a testable hypothesis. > > Bruno > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > To: everything-list <[email protected]> > Sent: Sun, Oct 19, 2014 12:19 pm > Subject: Re: Are We Really Conscious? (NYT Article today) > > > On 18 Oct 2014, at 17:00, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: > > Moreover, can consciousness be copied? Can we be duplicated mentally and > how well can we. If, consciousness is a substance, as Tegmark asserts, then > the pattern can be copied, right? > > > > If consciousness is a quantum substance, integrally, then it cannot be > cloned. > > But then also, computationalism is false. Computationalism is that > consciousness can be duplicated in the 3-1 view, like in the WM-duplication > experiment. Consciousness cannot be duplicated in the 1-view, though, that > is why there is a first person indeterminacy to begin with. But it is only > relative (like in QM, actually). > > But then, assuming comp, we have also that the physical substance, the > apparent primitive matter cannot be cloned, as it is a sum of infinities. > This must be weakened by the renormalization needed to hunt the white > rabbit away, and which is already consistent with the observable-logic > extracted from classical comp (comp + Theaetetus). > > Keep in mind that once we assume computationalism, we cannot refer to > the current physics in the argument, for logical reason. that elimiantes > consciousness with or without saying. With computationalism, it is also > equivalent with using God in a scientific explanation in theology. We can't > do that, independently of the existence of god or not, or here of the > physical universe or not. > > Bruno > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > To: everything-list <[email protected]> > Sent: Sat, Oct 18, 2014 9:23 am > Subject: Re: Are We Really Conscious? (NYT Article today) > > On 17 October 2014 09:40, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 16 October 2014 19:54, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >> A necessary side-effect roughly equates to the idea of weak emergence. > > > > > > Weak emergence of what, precisely? And in what way could this emergent > > something be distinguishable from the physical processes constituting it? > > Weak emergence of consciousness. The emergent phenomenon is > distinguishable from the physical processes constituting it in the way > any system is distinguishable from its parts, while still being > fundamentally nothing more than its parts. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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