On 20 October 2014 00:11, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > On 18 October 2014 14:22, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Weak emergence of consciousness. The emergent phenomenon is >> distinguishable from the physical processes constituting it in the way >> any system is distinguishable from its parts, while still being >> fundamentally nothing more than its parts. > > > A system can be distinguished from its parts, in the sense you seem to > intend, only in terms of some point of view that makes such distinctions > relevant. The trouble is that if we attempt to apply this analysis to > consciousness, what we get is a point of view that "emerges" from its > constituent parts only retroactively, in terms of itself. Doesn't this seem > rather circular?
(Apologies for the belated reply) Could you explain this further? Compare a brain with a car. Is a car diminished in some way in the absence of an appreciative observer but a brain not, or is it that the brain creates its own observer? If the latter, is that a problem? And how do you know that a car does not also in some ineffable way (because we're not cars, and can't appreciate even what this would mean) observe itself? Would it be right to say that the car's quasi-experience or lack of it is (a) meaningless because not externally observable, (b) wrong because not externally observable, (c) possible but unknowable, (d) trivial because equivalent to the assertion that the system is different from its parts? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
