On 8 November 2014 07:54, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: Are not the relations between the subsystems part of the ontology? >> > > Explicitly so in arithmetical realism, I would say. >
Not really. Perhaps I could respond both to you and Brent in one here. I'm trying to make an explicit distinction between an assumed ontology and its (possible) epistemological consequences. In comp, the assumed ontology is restricted to basic arithmetical relations; physics likewise is a search for a fundamental level of explanation in terms of which everything else can explicitly (at least in principle) be rendered. Of course, one can speak in terms of systems and sub-systems composed of such basic entities and relations. But it is surely a guiding principle of reductive explanation that such composites, and the relations between them, must ultimately be exhaustively accountable in terms of the fundamental ontological assumptions. If that were not the case, the attempted "reduction" would merely have been unsuccessful. Indeed it is only in terms of some explicit point of view that we are ever forced to contemplate a strong form of emergence, or "realism", about any level of composition over and above the reductive base. Strictly speaking, composite systems and relations are *epistemologically* real, rather than ontologically so, in any strong sense. In fact so-called "weak emergence" isn't really emergence at all as, objectively speaking, nothing is to be conceived as being "there" over and above the basic entities and their relations. So my point is that it is simply self-defeating to deny that there is in fact any such thing as epistemological realism, as Graziano explicitly does. In attempting to do so, he simply cuts the ground from under his own claim. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
